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ABSTRACT 
 
America’s public school system finds itself strongly challenged at a time when both 
domestic and world affairs call upon us to rethink the way we develop and prepare our country’s 
citizens. Unfortunately, countless students in school districts across the Nation daily receive 
unequal access to information in school, resulting from the inequitable distribution of resources 
caused by property tax based systems of funding public education. 
The Supreme Court declared in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that every student is entitled to equal access to equal 
information undergirding the critical thinking training they receive in schools. However, the 
Supreme Court sanctioned school funding disparities  caused by property tax based systems by 
claiming that there is no fundamental right to an education in the United States per the Court’s 
ruling in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). As a result, this paper asserts that the 
funding disparities resulting from property tax based school funding systems is the chief cause of 
disparate access to information in schools based purely on where students live. Disparate access to 
information in schools in turn leads to disparities in critical thinking training since the depth and 
degree of critical thinking training depends on one’s access to information in school. Disparate 
access to information in America’s public schools violates students’ First, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights and adversely affects our children for a lifetime. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 “America’s public school system finds itself strongly challenged at a time when both 
domestic and world affairs call upon us to rethink the way we develop and prepare our country’s 
citizens.”1 Unfortunately, countless students in school districts across the Nation daily receive 
unequal access to information in school, resulting from the inequitable distribution of resources 
caused by property tax based systems of funding public education.2  
The purpose of education is to train students to think critically, no matter the particular 
subject taught in school. Be it science, mathematics, or reading; art or physical education, the 
purpose of school is to teach students to think critically about the given subject’s underlying 
principles. Once taught to think critically in a variety of subjects, individuals then use their training 
to guide their beliefs and actions post-graduation.3 Though philosophers like Thomas Jefferson, 
Horace Mann, and others all had varying philosophies on the purpose of education,4 the central 
tenant of all those philosophies is critical thinking.   
“Critical thinking is the process of conceptualizing and analyzing information, gathered 
from observation or communication.”5 Given that the purpose of education is to train students to 
think critically, students must have access to information in order to be trained to conceptualize 
and analyze it. It follows then that the amount of information one has access to determines the 
                                                 
1 Ash, Carey Hawkins and Chanee D. Anderson (2013). The Same but Different: “Post Racial Inequality in American Public Education in The 
Resegregation of Schools: Education and Race in the Twenty-First Century. (p. 24). New York, NY: Routledge. 
2 Ash, Carey Hawkins and Chanee D. Anderson (2013). The Same but Different: “Post Racial Inequality in American Public Education in The 
Resegregation of Schools: Education and Race in the Twenty-First Century. (p. 24). New York, NY: Routledge. 
3 In Season 3, Episode 5, at 6:08 of the hit television series “Weeds” created by Jenji Kohan, character Shane Botwin gives this definition of critical 
thinking in response to his teacher’s questioning. The author finds this to be the most salient and succinct definition of critical thinking training and 
hereby asserts it forthwith. The episode may be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgwj14X1TZI#t=368. More information on the show 
itself may be found at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weeds_(TV_series) 
4 Tozier, S., Senese, G., & Paul, V. (2006). School and society: Historical and contemporary perspectives. (5th ed., p. 32). New York, New York: 
McGraw-Hill;  See also Carlton, F. (1908). Economic influences upon educational progress in the United States, 1820-1850. (1st ed., p. 55). 
Richmond, VA: William Byrd Press, citing Education and Prosperity, in Old South Leaflet, No. 144, also 12th Report. 
5 See footnote 3  
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depth and degree of one’s critical thinking training. As a result, students must have equal access to 
equal information if they are to be equally trained to think critically.  
 America’s current system of funding public education is primarily based on property taxes. 
As a result, the amount of revenue a school district generates for the provision of access to 
information through computers, books, quality teachers, and healthy facilities, among other things, 
varies widely since the property values undergirding the funding system vary widely by location. 
Due to the inherent disparities in property values, property tax based school funding systems 
produce gross disparities in the financial resources necessary to provide students access to 
information, the essential element of critical thinking training. Thus, this dissertation asserts that 
the funding disparities produced by property tax based school funding systems is the chief cause of 
disparate access to information in schools, based purely on where students live. Disparate access to 
information in schools in turn leads to disparities in critical thinking training, since the depth and 
degree of critical thinking training depends on access to information. These disparities violate 
students’ First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and adversely affect children for a 
lifetime. 
  
Research Questions 
The Supreme Court declared in Sweatt v. Painter6 and Brown v. Board of Education,7 
that every student is entitled to equal access to equal information undergirding critical thinking 
training in schools, but the Supreme Court sanctions property tax based school funding 
disparities by claiming that there is no fundamental right to an education in the United States, per 
the Court’s ruling San Antonio v. Rodriguez.8  
                                                 
6 339 U.S. 629 (1950) 
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
8 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
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Property tax based school funding systems harm adversely impacted students by 
comparatively restricting the amount of revenue property-poor school districts generate for the 
provision of access to information, in comparison to their wealthy counterparts. Such restricted 
access burdens students living in poorer areas with inferior critical thinking training because the 
comparatively meager funds their school districts generate provide comparatively meager access 
to information. Since access to information is the fundamental perquisite to critical thinking 
training, property poor districts provide comparatively meager critical thinking training, in 
comparison to relatively wealthy districts which can afford to provide their students with 
comparatively enhanced critical thinking training. Therefore, this dissertation endeavors to 
answer the following two questions: 
(1) What race-neutral federal constitutional grounds, if any, support the proposition that 
students have the individual right to equal access to equal information in public schools?  
(2) If students possess this individual right and are still denied equal access to equal 
information in schools, what is the appropriate remedy? 
 
Theoretical Framework and Methodological Approach 
 
The statistics in the next chapter show that minority students of color are most lacking in 
access to equal information in America’s public schools as measured by international 
standardized test scores. Though at one time, American courts would squarely address racial 
disparities, today, courts favor a “colorblind” ideology.9 As a result, my task is to craft a race 
neutral argument based on federal constitutional grounds that support the proposition that 
students have fundamental individual rights to access equal information in America’s public 
                                                 
9 See “Removing the Rubble: The Voluntary “Mistakes” of Seattle and Louisville” in Ash, Carey Hawkins and Chanee D. Anderson (2013). The 
Same but Different: “Post Racial Inequality in American Public Education in The Resegregation of Schools: Education and Race in the Twenty-First 
Century. (p. 6). New York, NY: Routledge. 
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schools. To achieve this end, I employ several theoretical frameworks and methodological 
approaches discussed immediately below.  
Critical legal studies, critical race theory, and critical race praxis are the three theoretical 
frameworks that will be used contextualize the questions above to establish a race-neutral 
articulation of an individual right to equal access to equal information in America’s public 
schools. These frameworks are important because they give an understanding of the intersection 
of race and law, which can then be used to excise one from the other. In this context, the 
application of critical legal studies helps reveal the law’s logic and structure in response to 
society’s power relationships to provide an understanding of why the law is structured the way it 
is.10 Critical race theory “analyzes ways in which law ignores cultural domination within law’s 
own processes and the ways in which those processes contribute to racial oppression.”11 Finally, 
critical race praxis contributes a critical, pragmatic, socio-legal analysis, which grounds justice in 
concrete realities.12 Critical race praxis and rethinks the cultural and communicative dimensions of 
justice claims,13 and facilitates the articulation of a race-neutral paradigm to appease the Supreme 
Court’s current jurisprudential trend.  
The harmonious application of these frameworks by one with legal training, while engaged 
in the practice of law, results in political lawyering: the practice of law, which infuses antiracism 
strategies with aspects of critical inquiry and pragmatism to transform the political lawyer’s legal 
theory into effective judicial remedies.14  Legal reasoning is the primary method by which a 
                                                 
10Critical Legal Studies: An Overview. (n.d.). Retrieved April 7, 2015, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/critical_legal_theory  
11 Yamamoto, E. (1997). Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America. Michigan Law 
Review, 95, 868. 
12 Yamamoto, E. (1997). Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America. Michigan Law 
Review, 95, 830. 
13 Yamamoto, E. (1997). Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America. Michigan Law 
Review, 95, 830. 
14 Yamamoto, E. (1997). Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America. Michigan Law 
Review, 95, 868. 
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(political) lawyer convinces a court to adopt his legal theory. Legal reasoning requires lawyers to 
(1) establish the context and meaning of facts through narrative analytic argument; (2) organize 
facts under legally relevant categories; (3) reason by analogy to previous judicial precedent; (4) 
frame the scopes of the issues to be decided, and (5) negotiate between the law “as it is” and the 
law “as it ought to be” through legal argument.15 Legal reasoning is the primary means by which a 
race-neutral, individual right to equally access equal information in America’s public schools will 
be articulated.  
Purpose and Significance of Study 
 
Unequivocally establishing the individual right to equal access to equal information in 
public schools in race-neutral terms would reaffirm Sweatt16 and Brown’s17 equality principle, 
overturn San Antonio v. Rodriguez,18 and declare unconstitutional property tax based public school 
funding schemes. States would have to re-think their school funding programs and establish them 
on a general revenue base, applied equally to all; and because the right to equal access to equal 
information in public schools would extend from the Federal Constitution on individual liberty 
grounds, the United States would be obligated to guarantee the right by funding the difference 
where the states, given their best effort to fully fund their schools on a general revenue basis, still 
could not supply the funds necessary to ensure each students’ equal access to equal information. 
The articulation of a race-neutral basis for the fundamental right to equal access to equal 
information in America’s public schools is important, not only for the individual, but for the 
country collectively: providing all students with equal access to equal information in schools will 
ensure America’s preeminence in the global economy for generations to come. 
                                                 
15 The Harvard Bridge Project: Introduction to Legal Reasoning. (n.d.). Retrieved April 7, 2015, from 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/r1_intro.htm, and its subsequent pages.  
16 339 U.S. 629 (1950) 
17 347 U.S. 483 (1954)  
18 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
  - 6 - 
CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1. The Programme for International Student Assessment’s (PISA) Triennial Survey is 
the Most Salient Indicator of the Current State of Critical Thinking Training in the 
United States 
 
America’s students are being under trained to compete and win for the United States in the 
global knowledge economy. The Programme for International Student Assessment’s (PISA) 
triennial survey is the most salient indicator of the current state of critical thinking training in the 
United States. The test is conducted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).19 “PISA offers insights into how participating countries and economies are 
beginning to develop their future talent pools by measuring the knowledge and skills of 15-year-
olds nearing the end of compulsory education.”20  In a global economy, the benchmark for success 
in education is no longer improvement against state or national standards alone, but increasingly in 
relation to the best-performing education systems internationally.21 
“PISA also shows how equitably participating countries and economies are providing 
education opportunities and realizing education outcomes, which is an indication of the level of 
equity in the society, as a whole.”22  The survey “assesses the extent to which 15-year-old students 
near the end of compulsory education have acquired key knowledge and skills that are essential for 
full participation in modern society.”23 “The assessment does not just ascertain whether students 
can reproduce knowledge; it also examines how well students can extrapolate from what they have 
                                                 
19 PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed, Volume II. (n.d.). Retrieved August 30, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-II.pdf, p. 19 
20 PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed, Volume II. (n.d.). Retrieved August 30, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-II.pdf, p. 26 
21 PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed, Volume II. (n.d.). Retrieved August 30, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-II.pdf, p. 3 
22 PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed, Volume II. (n.d.). Retrieved August 30, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-II.pdf, p. 26 (emphasis added) 
23 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 8 
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learned and apply that knowledge in unfamiliar settings, both in and outside of school.”24 “This 
approach reflects the fact that modern economies reward individuals not for what they know, but 
for what they can do with what they know.”25  
 
A. America’s Overall PISA Test Score Performance Is Not Improving 
 
Students in the United States have particular weaknesses in performing tasks that require 
higher-level critical thinking, “such as taking real-world situations, translating them into 
mathematical terms, and interpreting mathematical aspects in real-world problems.”26 Over one-
fourth (26%) of 15-year-olds in the United States “do not reach the PISA baseline Level 2 of 
mathematics proficiency,” the level at which students begin to demonstrate the skills that will 
enable them to compete and be rewarded with property in life.27  
Among the 34 OECD countries, the United States performed below average in 
mathematics in 2012 and is ranked 26 in the world. 28 The United States ranks 17 in reading and 21 
in science. 29 There has been no significant change in these performances over time. 30  
 
B. America’s Overall PISA Student Test Scores Vary Widely By Socio-Economic 
Status 
 
Of all the factors affecting critical thinking training and the resulting PISA test scores, 
socio-economic background is the most comprehensive, and has a significant impact on student 
performance in the United States. “Socio-economic status is a broad concept that summarizes 
                                                 
24 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 8 
25 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 8 (emphasis added) 
26 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 1 
27 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 2 
28 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 2 
29 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 2 
30 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 2 
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many different aspects of a student, school, or system.” 31 It includes social, racial, and economic 
status, “which is based on such indicators as parental education and occupation, the number and 
type of home possessions which are considered proxies for wealth, and the educational resources 
available at home.”32 
In the United States, two students from different socio-economic backgrounds vary much 
more in their learning outcomes than is normally the case in other countries. 33 “17% of the 
variation in student performance in the United States is explained by students’ socio-economic 
background. This contrasts with just 9% in Canada or Japan,” two benchmark PISA countries. 34 
“Only Hungary, Belgium, Turkey, Luxembourg, Chile, and Germany show a larger impact of 
socio-economic background on reading performance than the United States.”35 “It is important to 
emphasize that the United States, does not necessarily have a more disadvantaged socio-economic 
student intake than other countries around the world; but that socio-economic differences among 
students have a particularly strong impact on student learning outcomes” in the United States.36 
“The close relationship between the learning outcomes of students in the United States and socio-
economic background is not simply explained by a more socio-economically heterogeneous 
student population or society, but as noted before, [it is] mainly because socio-economic 
disadvantage [otherwise, being poor] translates more directly into poor educational performance in 
                                                 
31 PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed, Volume II. (n.d.). Retrieved August 30, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-II.pdf, p. 37 
32 PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed, Volume II. (n.d.). Retrieved August 30, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-II.pdf, p. 37 
33 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 230 
34 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 230 
35 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 230 
36 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 34 
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the United States than is the case in many other countries.” 37 The forgoing statistics, as sobering as 
they are, are even more enlightening when disaggregated by the socio-economic criterion of race. 
 
C. America’s Mathematics PISA Test Scores Vary Widely By Race 
 
The OECD mathematics average is 494.38 The United States has an average score of 481, 
which is a 13-point deficit in comparison to the OECD average. 39  However, the average 
mathematics score of white Americans is 506, 12 points above the OECD average and 25 points 
above America’s overall domestic average.40 Asian Americans fare best at math in the United 
States with a score of 549, which is 55 points above the OECD average and 68 points above 
America’s average.41 Hispanic Americans and African Americans fare the worst at mathematics. 
The Hispanic American average is 455, which is 39 points behind the OECD average, 26 points 
behind the overall American average, 51 points behind white Americans, and 94 points behind 
Asian Americans. 42  With respect to African Americans, they average just 421 points in 
mathematics, 73 points behind the OECD average, 60 points behind America’s domestic average, 
85 points behind white Americans, and 128 points behind Asian Americans.43 The scores of 
Hispanic and African Americans place these subgroups in the lower ranks of the world’s 
                                                 
37 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 34 
38 Table M12. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA mathematics literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 
16, 2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_3f_1.asp 
39 Table M12. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA mathematics literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 
16, 2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_3f_1.asp 
40 Table M12. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA mathematics literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 
16, 2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_3f_1.asp 
41 Table M12. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA mathematics literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 
16, 2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_3f_1.asp 
42 Table M12. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA mathematics literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 
16, 2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_3f_1.asp 
43 Table M4. Average scores of 15-year-old students on PISA mathematics literacy scale, by education system: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http:// http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_3a.asp 
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countries44 and makes these students the academic peers of students in countries such as Turkey 
and Romania, and Malaysia and Mexico, respectively. 45   
 
D. America’s Reading PISA Test Scores Vary Widely By Race 
 
The OECD reading average is 496.46 The United States has an average reading score of 
498.47 White Americans’ average reading score is 519, which is 23 points above the OECD 
average and 21 points above America’s domestic average. Asian Americans fare best at reading in 
the United States with a score of 550, which is 54 points above the OECD average and 52 points 
above America’s average. 48 Hispanic Americans and African Americans fare the worst at reading. 
The Hispanic average is 478, which is 18 points behind the OECD average, 20 points behind the 
overall American average, 41 points behind white Americans, and 72 points behind Asian 
Americans. 49 With respect to African Americans, they average 443 points in reading, which is 53 
points behind the OECD average, 55 points behind America’s domestic average, 76 points behind 
white Americans, and 107 points behind Asian Americans. 50 The scores of Hispanic and African 
Americans place these subgroups in the lower ranks of the world’s countries. Their performance in 
reading makes these students the academic peers of students in countries such as Lithuania and 
Greece, Costa Rica, and the United Arab Emirates, respectively. 51   
                                                 
44 Table M4. Average scores of 15-year-old students on PISA mathematics literacy scale, by education system: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http:// http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_3a.asp 
45 Table M12. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA mathematics literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 
16, 2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_3f_1.asp 
46 Table R7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA reading literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_5e_1.asp 
47 Table R7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA reading literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_5e_1.asp 
48 Table R7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA reading literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_5e_1.asp 
49 Table R7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA reading literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_5e_1.asp 
50 Table R7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA reading literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_5e_1.asp 
51 Table R2. Average scores of 15-year-old students on PISA reading literacy scale, by education system: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_5a.asp 
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E. America’s Science PISA Test Scores Vary Widely By Race 
 
The OECD science average is 501.52 The United States has an average science score of 
497.53 White Americans’ average science score is 528, which is 27 points above the OECD 
average and 31 points above America’s domestic average. Asian Americans fare best at science in 
the United States with a score of 546, which is 45 points above the OECD average and 49 points 
above America’s average. 54  Hispanic Americans and African Americans fare the worst at science. 
The Hispanic average is 462, which is 39 points behind the OECD average, 35 points behind the 
overall American average, 66 points behind white Americans, and 84 points behind Asian 
Americans. 55  With respect to African Americans, they average 439 points in science, which is 62 
points behind the OECD average, 58 points behind America’s domestic average, 89 points behind 
white Americans, and 107 points behind Asian Americans. 56 The scores of Hispanic and African 
Americans place these subgroups in the lower ranks of the world’s countries. Their performance in 
science makes them the academic peers of students in countries such as Turkey, Romania and 
Cyprus, respectively. 57   
 
 
                                                 
52 Table S7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA science literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_4e_1.asp 
53 Table S7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA science literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_4e_1.asp 
54 Table S7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA science literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_4e_1.asp 
55 Table S7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA science literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_4e_1.asp 
56 Table S7. Average scores of U.S. 15-year-old students on PISA science literacy scale, by race/ethnicity: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 
2014, from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_4e_1.asp 
57 Table S2. Average scores of 15-year-old students on PISA science literacy scale, by education system: 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 2014, 
from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/pisa2012/pisa2012highlights_4a.asp 
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2. Wide Variations in America’s Test Scores Based on Race and Socioeconomic Status 
Hinders Students and Costs the United States Trillions of Dollars and Its Competitive 
Edge in The Global Economy 
 
PISA evaluates what students know and what they can do with that knowledge in 
comparison to the rest of the world. 58 Thus, the disaggregation of America’s PISA test scores by 
race shows that Hispanic and African American students demonstrate comparatively little 
knowledge, whereas white and Asian Americans demonstrate comparatively more. Based on this 
comparison, African and Hispanic Americans are not being equitably trained to demonstrate the 
knowledge and skills that will enable them to compete and win salary, wages, and other property to 
the fullest degree in life (in comparison to their white and Asian counterparts) given that modern 
economies reward individuals for what they know and what they can do with what they know.59  
Additionally, variations in test scores by race and other disparities in achievement impose 
an invisible, yet recurring, loss on the economy of the United States which puts the United States at 
a global economic disadvantage.60 A study carried out by the OECD, in collaboration with the 
Hoover Institute at Stanford University, suggests that “a modest goal of having the United States 
boost its average PISA scores by 25 points over the next 20 years could add 41 trillion dollars to 
the United States economy over the lifetime of the generation born in 2010.” 61 Narrowing the 
achievement gap by bringing all students to the baseline level of proficiency for the OECD could 
increase the gross domestic product of the United States by 72 trillion dollars. 62 Bringing the 
                                                 
58 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 8 
59 United States Country Note - Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Results from PISA 2012. (n.d.). Retrieved August 15, 2014, 
from http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf, p. 8 
60 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 38 
61 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 38 
62 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 38 
  - 13 - 
United States up to the average performance of Finland, which is 23 points ahead of the United 
States, would add gains on the order of 103 trillion dollars. 63 
In order for America to increase its overall PISA scores to reap the corresponding 
economic benefits, it must create a successful school system. Education systems that are successful 
direct the highest-quality resources to where these resources can make the most difference in 
promoting equity.64 In this case, America must directly and ubiquitously dedicate the highest-
quality resources to equitably training its Hispanic and African American students to think 
critically the same as it does its white and Asian American students. The United States must 
operate a school system that neutralizes the impact race, residence, and the other socio-economic 
elements have on critical thinking training to immediately begin closing the test score gap to reap 
the resulting economic benefits for the greater good of the country. However, there is little hope. 
America will leave trillions of dollars on the table, not because the United States lacks the 
resources to improve the critical thinking training provided to Hispanic and African Americans,65 
but because the United States actively maintains a school funding system which fails to to provide 
equal access to equal information to all its students in schools.  
The United States has adopted an ideology of inequality with regard to distributing school 
resources for critical thinking training in contrast to other countries around the world. “It is 
noteworthy that spending patterns in many of the world’s successful education systems are 
markedly different from those in the United States.”66 Successful systems such as Canada, Finland 
                                                 
63Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 38 
64PISA 2012 Results: Excellence through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed, Volume II. (n.d.). Retrieved August 30, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-II.pdf, p. 28  
65 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 28 
66 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 53 
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and Shanghai-China “invest money where the challenges are greatest.” 67 However, the United 
States makes “the resources that are devoted to schools dependent on the wealth of the local 
communities” where students live, which results in substantial funding disparities given the wide 
variation in property values.68 Thus, America’s inequities in funding critical thinking training are 
not the result of happenstance; they are the result of an affirmative choice. In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court judicially sanctions America’s public school funding disparities based on property 
values.  
 
3. Wide Disparities in Critical Thinking Training Exist Because San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez Disavows the Fundamental Right to Access Equal Information in 
America’s Public Schools 
 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez 69  unequivocally expresses America’s current ideology 
regarding the provision of access to information and the resulting critical thinking training in 
schools: gross inequities in the distribution of resources which provide access to information in 
schools are permissible because there is no such thing as the right to equally access that 
information in America’s public schools.   
San Antonio70 upholds the disparities caused by the property tax based system of funding 
access to information and the resulting critical thinking training in America’s public schools.  In 
particular, San Antonio upheld Texas’ property tax based school finance system which 
preferentially provided for students residing in the wealthy, majority caucasian, Alamo Heights 
School District over students living in the poorer, majority Mexican-American, Edgewood 
School District. When the Supreme Court upheld Texas’ disparate property tax based school 
                                                 
67 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 53 
68 Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA 2012 for the United States. (n.d.). Retrieved August 29, 2014, from 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/46623978.pdf, p. 53 
69 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
70 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
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funding system, the Court upheld gross resource disparities for all school districts operating 
property tax based funding systems across the country. Because property tax based funding 
systems make the schools’ resources dependent on the varying property values of the local 
communities where students live, the San Antonio Court simultaneously declared in no uncertain 
terms that students in the United States have no absolute right to the resources which would 
make their access to information equal with their peers because their property is not valued the 
same as their peers. Thus, students in property poor districts have no right to the same degree of 
critical thinking training as their wealthy peers, given the connection between property tax based 
school funding systems, access to information in schools, and the resulting critical thinking 
training. This is wholly contrary to the Court’s holding in Sweatt v. Painter,71 Brown v. Board of 
Education,72 and other Supreme Court cases as argued below. As a result, this paper now turns to 
argue the existence of students’ First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access equal 
information in America’s public schools. 
                                                 
71 339 U.S. 629 (1950) 
72 347 U.S. 485 (1954) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EQUAL ACCESS TO EQUAL INFORMATION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
IS A FUNDAMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT 
  
 
1. Equal Access to Information in Public Schools is a Fundamental First Amendment 
Right Which Is Violated By Property Tax Based School Funding Systems 
 
 
A. Equal Access to Information Generally is a Fundamental First Amendment Right 
 
The right to receive information73 and ideas is fundamental to our Democracy.74 This right 
vests in the constitutional freedoms of speech and press and is protected from Congressional 
abridgement by the First Amendment. The right is applied against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.75 Therefore, the First and Fourteenth Amendments collectively protect the right to 
receive information and ideas.76 The First Amendment provides:  
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.” 
 
The central goal of the First Amendment is to guarantee the free and equal flow of 
information,77 and such “has long been recognized as a core objective of the First Amendment to 
the Constitution.”78 The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the primary function of the First 
Amendment is “to ensure the widest possible dissemination of information,”79 and the “unfettered 
                                                 
73 Information means any knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics. Exec. 
Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 2 (Jan. 5, 2010) 
74 The Right to Receive Information and Ideas Willingly Offered: First Amendment Protection for the Communication Process, 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 
497, 504-05 (1979) (citing 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) on the importance of information in a democracy: “A popular 
government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or Tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will 
forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”  
75 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  
76  The Right to Receive Information and Ideas Willingly Offered: First Amendment Protection for the Communication Process, 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 
497, 505 (1979), citing generally, T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 3, 650 (1970) 
77 The Right to Receive Information and Ideas Willingly Offered: First Amendment Protection for the Communication Process, 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 
497, 506 (1979) 
78 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 n.18 (1978) (Stevens, J. dissenting) 
79 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); See also Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil Rights - 
Civil Liberties Law Review, 12(3), 520, fn. 8. 
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interchange of ideas,”80 concerning “all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to 
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”81 As a result, the First 
Amendment protects the total communication process and encompasses recipients’ interests in 
receiving information and ideas.82 Lamont v. Postmaster General establishes this principle.83  
In Lamont, the plaintiff successfully challenged a federal statue prohibiting his receipt of 
information from abroad. By ruling in Lamont’s favor, after granting him independent standing 
without the speaker conveying the information, the Court “acknowledged that the potential 
recipients of [information] possess independently assertable first amendment rights.”84 This is 
because “[t]he dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are 
not free to receive and consider them.”85 
The legitimacy of the right to receive information has been expounded in other Supreme 
Court decisions. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 86  the central question addressed the U. S. State 
Department’s authority to deny a visa to a Marxist scholar. Though the State Department’s 
authority to grant or deny persons admission to the United States prevailed, the Supreme Court 
specifically said that First Amendment freedoms “necessarily protect the right to receive 
information.” 87  Justice Thurgood Marshall, in dissent, gave this right the most extensive 
treatment. There he said, 
“The First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas…The 
reason for this is that the First Amendment protects a process…and the right to 
inform others and to be informed…are inextricably part of that process.” 88 
                                                 
80 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1987); See also Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil Rights - Civil 
Liberties Law Review, 12(3), 520, fn. 8. 
81 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1946); See also Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil Rights - Civil 
Liberties Law Review, 12(3), 520, fn. 8. 
82 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 n.18 (1978) (Stevens, J. dissenting). See also The Right to Receive Information and Ideas Willingly 
Offered: First Amendment Protection for the Communication Process, 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 497, 506 (1979) 
83 381 U.S. 301 (1965) 
84 The Right to Receive Information and Ideas Willingly Offered: First Amendment Protection for the Communication Process, 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 
497, 509 (1979) 
85 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)(Brennan, J. concurring) 
86 408 U.S. 753 (1972) 
87 408 U.S. 753 at 762-63(1972) 
88 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) 
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Protecting this process “is a fundamental principle of the American Government.”89 
The First Amendment means the Government has no power “to abridge the 
freedoms necessary to make that process work.”90 
 
Relying on Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Kleindienst, the Supreme Court ultimately 
determined in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., that 
the right to receive information is cognizable under the First Amendment because “the protection 
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”91 
The breadth and depth of First Amendment rights is evinced by the fact that even prison 
inmates have the full panoply of First Amendment rights so long as exercising those rights does 
not cause unrest or disruption. See Procunier v. Martinez.92 The problem in Procunier was one of 
access to information and ideas. 93  There, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Justice Marshall’s 
reasoning in Kleindienst by declaring that the interests of letter writing inmates and their intended 
recipients are “inextricably meshed.”94 The Court flatly rejected any attempt to justify restricting 
the flow of information “merely by reference to certain assumptions about the legal status of 
prisoners.”95 As a result, the Court turned to decisions dealing with the general problem of 
incidental restrictions on First Amendment liberties to guide its analysis, not to cases involving 
questions of a special set of ‘prisoners’ rights.’96 Thus, the general rule is the broad application 
of First Amendment rights to preserve the free and full flow of information between senders and 
recipients.  
 
                                                 
89 408 U.S. 753, 776 (1972) 
90 408 U.S. 753, 776 (1972) 
91 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) 
92 416 U.S. 396 (1974).   
93 Martha L. Black, Comment: School Library Censorship: First Amendment Guarantees and the Student’s Right to Know, 57 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 523, 
536 (1979) 
94 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974) 
95 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974) 
96 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974) 
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B.  Students Have Fundamental First Amendment Rights to Access Information 
America’s Public Schools 
 
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Establishes Students’ First Amendment Rights to Access 
Information in Public Schools 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines97 forms the basis of 
students’ First Amendment rights to access to information in America’s public schools. Tinker 
dealt directly with students’ freedom to affirmatively control their own learning. In Tinker, the 
students themselves were conduits of information.98  
The Tinker Court declared unconstitutional a regulation forbidding students from wearing 
black armbands in school in silent, non-disruptive protest of the Vietnam War. 99 The Court viewed 
the prohibition as an infringement on students’ First Amendment freedoms to impart and receive 
information in schools.100 
Tinker represents the Supreme Court’s complete abandonment of its earlier judicial 
deference to the states’ indoctrinating authority101 which allowed the states to curtail students’ First 
Amendment freedoms based on the premise that local school officials needed broad discretion in 
shaping young minds to accomplish the goals of socialization and academic achievement.102 
However, Tinker uprooted the notion that states “possess absolute authority over their students.”103 
The Court found that “students in school as well as out of school are persons under our 
Constitution,” 104  and that students “are possessed of fundamental rights which the state must 
                                                 
97 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
98 Sheldon H. Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1479, 1481 (1972) 
99 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
100 Augusta Maria Salem, Removal of Public School Library Books: The First Amendment Versus the Local School Board, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1407, 
1412 (1981) 
101 See Sheldon H. Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1479, 1481 
(1972); See also Martha L. Black, Comment: School Library Censorship: First Amendment Guarantees and the Student’s Right to Know, 57 U. Det. J. 
Urb. L. 523, 534 (1979) 
102 Martha L. Black, Comment: School Library Censorship: First Amendment Guarantees and the Student’s Right to Know, 57 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 523, 
529 (1979) 
103 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) 
104 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) 
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respect.” 105 Students “may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state 
chooses to communicate.”106 
The Court’s departure from deference was grounded in public education’s function, the 
students’ interests, and the inherent nature of schools.107 The Court relied on West Virginia v. 
Barnette,108 to establish the full measure of students’ First Amendment rights, saying: 
 “The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the states, protects the citizens 
against the state itself and all of its creatures---Boards of Education not excepted. 
These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but 
none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are 
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at 
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as 
mere platitudes.”109  
 
Based on this holding, Tinker represents a “First Amendment theory of education” which aligns 
with current educational theories based on students’ needs and interests.110 By emphasizing the 
transfer and receipt of information as an “inevitable” and “important” parts of the educational 
process,111 the Court did three things: (1) it affirmed students First Amendment rights, (2) it 
demolished the longstanding indoctrination framework with respect to lower levels of schooling, 
and (3) it established students’ right to access information in the totality of the school by saying, 
“A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he 
is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized 
hours, he may express his opinions [and receive information].” Under our 
Constitution, First Amendment rights are not given “only to be so circumscribed 
that [they] exist in principle but not in fact…The Constitution says that Congress 
(and the states) may not abridge [First Amendment rights]. This provision means 
what it says. We do not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights 
                                                 
105 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) 
106 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) 
107 Martha L. Black, Comment: School Library Censorship: First Amendment Guarantees and the Student’s Right to Know, 57 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 523, 
534 (1979) 
108 319 U.S. 624 (1923) 
109 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) 
110 Sheldon H. Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1032, 1061 
(1970) 
111 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) 
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to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and 
ordained discussion in a school classroom.” 112 
 
Tinker reinforces the general rule which is the broad application of the First Amendment right to 
access information, even for students in America’s public schools.  
 
2. Sweatt v. Painter and Brown v. Board of Education Establish Students’ Right to the 
Same Degree of Access to the Same Information Being Conveyed to Other Similarly 
Situated Students in America’s Public Schools 
 
 
More than Tinker, 113 Sweatt v. Painter114 and Brown v. Board of Education115 establish 
students’ Constitutional rights to the same degree of access to the same information provided to 
all other students.  
The fundamental right to equally access the same information as provided to all other 
students was first articulated in the context of legal education in Sweatt v. Painter.116 In Sweatt, 
Heman Sweatt was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School because he was 
African American. The state trial court recognized that the state’s action denying Sweatt the 
opportunity to access the same information granted to others deprived him of the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.117 However, the trial court did 
not grant Sweatt’s admission to the law school.118  Instead, the court continued the case for six 
months to allow the state to establish separate but substantially equal facilities.119 In December, 
1946, at the expiration of the six month continuance, the court denied Sweatt’s claim for 
admission on the showing that the authorized university officials adopted an order calling for the 
                                                 
112 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969) 
113 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
114 339 U.S. 629 (1950) 
115 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
116 339 U.S. 629 (1950) 
117 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1950) 
118 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1950) 
119 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1950) 
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opening of a law school for African Americans beginning February, 1947. 120  Though the 
separate law school for African Americans was made available, Sweatt refused to enroll there.121  
The University of Texas Law School, which refused to admit Sweatt, “was staffed by a 
faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors, some of whom were nationally 
recognized authorities in their field.”122 Its student body numbered 850 and its library contained 
over 65,000 volumes.123 Among the other offerings available to the students were a law review, 
moot court facilities, scholarship funds, and an Order of the Coif affiliation.124 Moreover, the 
school’s alumni occupied the most distinguished positions in the private practice of law and in 
public life in the state of Texas.125 The school was properly considered one of the nation's 
ranking law schools.126  
By contrast, the University of Texas had no plans for an independent faculty or for a 
comparable library for the African American law school.127 Teaching was to be conducted by 
four members of the University of Texas Law School faculty who would maintain their offices at 
the University of Texas Law School while teaching at both institutions.128 Additionally, few of 
the 10,000 volumes ordered for the library (in comparison to the University of Texas’ 65,000 
volumes) had arrived by the time the school was set to open, nor was there any full-time librarian. 
Moreover, the African American law school lacked accreditation. 129  In comparing the two 
schools, the United States Supreme Court held: 
“We cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered 
white and [African American] law students by the state. In terms of number of the 
faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student 
                                                 
120 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1950) 
121 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1950) 
122 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950) 
123 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950) 
124 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950) 
125 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950) 
126 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950) 
127 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950) 
128 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950) 
129 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950) 
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body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities, the 
University of Texas Law School is superior. What is more important, the 
University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities 
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a 
law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, 
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in 
the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a 
free choice between these law schools would consider the question close.”130 
 
With this comparison in mind, the Supreme Court ultimately determined that Sweatt was entitled 
to his full constitutional right: equal access to information and the resulting critical thinking 
training “equivalent to that offered by the state to students of other races.” 131 The Supreme Court 
determined that all students are entitled to the same degree of access to the same information 
provided to all other students, and that an assessment of whether students are being provided the 
same degree of access, turns on the measurement of access to both tangible and intangible inter-
school factors.  
What Sweatt 132  did for legal education, Brown v. Board of Education 133  did for 
elementary and secondary education. The United States Supreme Court in Brown specifically 
identified students’ rights to the same degree of access to the same information being provided to 
all other students.  
The question put squarely before the Brown Court was whether states are obligated to 
provide the same degree of access to the same information being provided to all other students 
enrolled in public schools. The Brown Court unequivocally declared that states are forbidden 
from providing disparate access and disparate information to students because doing so violates 
students’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the laws. As a result, the Supreme 
Court ruled that Linda Brown was entitled to the same degree of access to the same information 
                                                 
130 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950) 
131 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) 
132 339 U.S. 629 (1950) 
133 347 U.S. 485 (1954) 
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provided to all other students similarly situated in America’s public schools. The Brown Court 
relied on Sweatt to say,  
“In Sweatt v. Painter, in finding that a segregated law school for [African 
Americans] could not provide them equal [access to information], this Court 
relied in large part on ‘those qualities which are incapable of objective 
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.’ In McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), the Court, in requiring that a 
[African American] admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other 
students, again resorted to intangible considerations: …his ability to study, to 
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to 
learn his profession.’134 Such considerations apply with added force to children in 
grade and high schools.”135 
 
The Brown Court then emphasized its ultimate point by speaking affirmatively into the Ages:  
“Today, [the transmission of information in schools] is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance 
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of 
the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed 
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In 
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in 
life if he is denied the opportunity [to equally access equal information in schools]. 
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be made available to all on equal terms.” Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 
Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added). 
 
Sweatt136 and Brown,137 and those following in its line, “redefined equality in American 
law and set forth a conception of equal rights unprecedented in American history.”138 By the 
Court’s ruling in Sweatt and Brown, states are obligated to provide the same degree of access to 
the same information being provided to all other students enrolled in their public schools. The 
Supreme Court determined that anything which hinders a student’s “ability to study, to engage in 
                                                 
134 [otherwise, to receive and transmit information] 
135 Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) 
136 339 U.S. 629 (1950) 
137 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
138 Anderson, J. (2006). A tale of two "Browns": Constitutional equality and unequal education. Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of 
Education, 105(2), 22. 
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discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn,” otherwise, to 
access and exchange information generally, violates the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court outlawed “separate but equal” education, it clearly established that all students 
have equal Constitutional rights to access the same information and the same information 
bearing conduits to the same degree as all other students in schools, and that this right is on par 
with any other Constitutional right granted textually therein.139 Noted education scholar, Beverly 
Tatum, emphasizes this point by saying,  
“When African Americans pressed for an end to legalized school segregation in 
the years leading up to the 1954 Brown v. Board of Topeka decision, it was not 
the companionship of white children they were seeking for their children: It was 
access to educational resources. The schools white children attended had better 
facilities, better equipment and supplies, more curricular options, and often 
(although not always) more highly trained teachers than those serving black 
children. Black parents believed that equal access to those publicly funded 
resources was their children’s birthright. Attending the same schools white 
children did seemed the most likely means to achieve it.”140  
 
Thus, by the rulings of the Supreme Court in Tinker, Sweatt, and Brown, all public school 
students have equal Constitutional rights to (1) the same degree of access (2) to the same 
conduits of information (3) to ultimately be provided with the same information in America’s 
public schools.  
 
                                                 
139 Drucker, P. (1968). The age of discontinuity: Guidelines to our changing society. (p. 274). New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers. 
140 Kozal, J., Tatum, B. D., Eaton, S., & Gándara, P. (2010). What’s the answer? Educational Leadership, 68(3), 28–31. 
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C.  Property Tax Schemes of Funding Public Schools Are Prior Restraints Which 
Violate Students’ First Amendment Rights by Limiting Certain Students’ Access 
to Information in Schools 
 
1. Tax Schemes that Limit Access to the Conduits of Information are Prior Restraints 
Which Violate First Amendment Rights  
 
Government actions that “significantly curtail the dissemination of information and 
ideas” are prior restraints and are “the primary evil against which the First Amendment was 
directed.”141 For this reason, the Supreme Court disallows burdens on the conduits transferring 
information, because the First Amendment affords great protection to the total information transfer 
process. 
 Grosjean v. American Press Co. stands for the proposition that an individual has the right 
“to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties” resulting from transmitting and receiving 
information.142 In Grosjean, the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana state tax on newspapers 
finding that the issue went to “the heart of the natural right of the members of an organized society 
to impart and acquire information.”143 
The Grosjean Court noted that for more than a century prior to the adoption of the First 
Amendment, there was a persistent effort on the part of the British Government to prevent or 
abridge the free flow of information, and that the struggle between the measures’ proponents and 
those who asserted the free right “was continuous and unceasing.”144 When Parliament taxed the 
primary information bearing conduits of the time, specifically newspapers and advertisements, 
“there followed more than a century of resistance to, and evasion of the taxes, and of agitation for 
their repeal.”145 These taxes “constituted one of the factors that led the American colonists to 
                                                 
141 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); See also Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties 
Law Review, 12(3), 519. 522.   
142 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 244 (1936) 
143 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 243 (1936) 
144 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 245 (1936) 
145 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 246 (1936) 
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protest against taxation for the purposes of the home government; and that the Revolution really 
began when, in 1765, that government sent stamps for newspaper duties to the American 
colonies.”146 The Court explained that: 
“These duties were quite commonly characterized as “taxes on knowledge,” a 
phrase used for the purpose of describing the effect of the exactions and at the same 
time condemning them. That the taxes had, and were intended to have, the effect of 
curtailing the [free flow of information]…went almost without question, even on 
the part of those who defended the act.”147 
 
The Grosjean Court noted that “the aim of the struggle was not to relieve taxpayers from a 
burden,” but instead to establish and preserve the People’s “right to full information,”148 because 
the taxes were “effectual in limiting the circulation of [information].”149 Thus, after carefully 
considering the effect of the newspaper tax, the Court found it sufficient that the Louisiana statute 
was likely to “curtail the opportunity for the acquisition of knowledge,” and so held the tax to be an 
impermissible and unconstitutional prior restraint.150 
“The major reason for application of the prior restraint doctrine to Grosjean was the 
significant curtailment of the dissemination of ideas engendered by the tax.”151 As a result, it is 
“impossible to believe that [the First Amendment] was not intended to bring within the reach of 
[its] words such modes of restraint” as are embodied in taxes schemes which restrict the circulation 
of information to the citizenry. It is in this context that the Grosjean court definitively ruled: 
 “The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the 
appellees…It is bad because, in light of its history and of its present setting, it… 
limits the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the 
constitutional guarantees.”152  
 
 
                                                 
146 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 246 (1936) 
147 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 246-47 (1936) 
148 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 247 (1936) (emphasis supplied) 
149 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 246-47 (1936); See also Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil 
Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, 12(3), 523 
150 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247 (1936) 
151 Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, 12(3), 524 
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2. Property Tax Based Schemes of Funding Public Schools are Prior Restraints 
Which Violate Students’ First Amendment Rights by Limiting Their Access to the 
Same Information Bearing Conduits as Other Similarly Situated Students in Public 
Schools  
 
The Supreme Court’s precedent in Grosjean teaches that “it is the likely effect, rather than 
the form, of a governmental intrusion” upon First Amendment freedoms that is the touchstone of 
“whether such an intrusion amounts to a prior restraint.”153 As the Grosjean court noted, tax 
schemes that “curtail the opportunity for the acquisition of knowledge by the people”154 are 
invalid under the Constitution.  As a result, this section asserts that effect of property tax based 
systems of funding public education curtail the opportunity of adversely impacted students to 
access conduits of information in schools, and as such, is an impermissible prior restraint on 
students’ First Amendment freedoms. In order to apply the highest level of judicial scrutiny to 
this prior restraint, it must be shown that: (1) property tax based systems of funding public 
education are likely to substantially restrict students’ access to particular conduits of information, 
and (2) that the information students to access is at least arguably protected by the First 
Amendment.155 Once the tax system is demonstrated as: (1) likely curtail students’ access to 
information and (2) that the information students seek to access in schools is protected by the 
First Amendment, property tax based systems of funding public education must be deemed 
unconstitutional unless the system is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.156  
 
                                                 
153 Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, 12(3), 523 
153 Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, 12(3), 527 
154 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 247 (1936); See also Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil Rights 
- Civil Liberties Law Review, 12(3), 534 
155 Litwack, T. (1977). The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, 12(3), 552 
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A. Property Tax Based Systems of Funding Public Education Restrict Students’ Access 
to Conduits of Information in Public Schools 
 
The connection between school districts’ limited financial resources and the resulting 
limits on a students’ access to the necessary conduits of information in public schools was most 
recently elucidated in Williams v. State of California. 157  Williams was filed on the 46th 
anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 158  on May 17, 2000, by nearly one hundred 
California schoolchildren who attended public schools in substandard learning conditions.159 The 
plaintiffs sued the State of California, the California Board of Education, the California 
Department of Education, and the California Superintendent of Schools collectively as 
defendants.160  The plaintiffs claimed that overwhelming disparities in school funding result in 
depravations of access to the essential conduits, which circulate the information necessary to equal 
critical thinking training in public schools.161  
Williams is important because the plaintiffs called upon a host of nationally renown experts 
to define the necessary conduits of information to which all students must have equal access to in 
public schools. 162 The experts further showed how access to those conduits is premised on a 
school district’s access to financial resources. 163  The experts’ reports were synthesized by 
Professor Jeannie Oakes, Presidential Professor of the Graduate School of Education and 
Information Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles and are cited in relevant 
portions in the section immediately below. The experts determined that “qualified teachers, 
relevant instructional materials that students may use in school and at home, and clean, safe, and 
                                                 
157 Order Regarding Approval of Settlement Notice and Schedule in Williams v. State of California. San Francisco County Superior Court. No. 
312236 (8/13/2004). 
158 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
159 Notice of Settlement in Williams v. State of California. San Francisco County Superior Court. No. 312236 (8/13/2004), p. 2 
160 Notice of Settlement in Williams v. State of California. San Francisco County Superior Court. No. 312236 (8/13/2004), p. 2 
161 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Williams v. State of California. San Francisco County Superior Court. No. 312236, at 6 
162 See Experts, Decent Schools for California – Williams v. State of California, http://decentschools.org/experts.php.  
163 See Experts, Decent Schools for California – Williams v. State of California, http://decentschools.org/experts.php.  
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educationally appropriate facilities are fundamentally important to students’ education.”164 These 
conduits transfer the information “that the state has specified as important.”165  
 
1. Qualified Teachers are Essential Conduits of Information in Public Schools 
 
 “A wealth of scholarly studies demonstrate the relationship between teacher quality and 
student achievement.”166 In fact,  
“Among the school resource measures, the level of teacher experience and a 
related measure—the percentage of teachers without a full credential—are the 
variables most strongly related to student achievement. Teachers’ level of 
education, measured by the percentage of teachers with a master’s degree or 
higher, in some cases is positively and significantly related to test scores but not 
nearly as uniformly as the measures of teacher experience. Similarly, a higher 
percentage of teachers with only a bachelor’s degree within a given grade is 
negatively related to student achievement.”167 
 
Moreover, the best available research shows that subject-specific teacher training directly 
affects student achievement.168 “Students of teachers who are not fully certified in mathematics 
perform less well than students whose teachers are certified in math.” 169 There is also a proven 
correlation between teacher certification, teacher experience, and teacher preparation, and 
student achievement which holds even after the effects of student poverty are factored out.170 As 
a result, the relationship between qualified teachers and student achievement is made plain: as 
student achievement in the modern age is measured by standardized test scores, and as 
standardized tests are based on the amount and quality of the information transmitted to and 
                                                 
164 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
of California at 1. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf 
165 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
of California at 1. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf 
166 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
of California at 5. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf 
167 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
of California at 6. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf 
168 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
of California at 6. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf 
169 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
of California at 7. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf 
170 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
of California at 7. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf 
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retained by students, teachers, therefore, are conduits of information in schools because they are 
a essential to transferring the information the states require students to know.  
 
2. Textbooks and Instructional Materials are Essential Conduits of Information in 
Public Schools 
 
Instructional materials are conduits of information that are just as critical to the 
information transfer process as teachers.171 “Not only is the textbook the central tool in almost all 
forms of schooling, it is accepted internationally as a necessary tool for learning.” 172  For 
example, the World Bank considers textbooks “a critical part of education, as necessary as the 
classroom itself, as indispensable as the classroom teacher.” 173  Moreover, international 
organizations such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization “stipulate that textbooks are 
an important indicator of educational quality and use a standard of one textbook for each pupil in 
every subject as the standard for an adequate supply.”174  
 Textbooks and curriculum materials are so “consistently related to student learning in 
part because having a textbook to take home makes it possible for students to complete 
meaningful homework.”175 As a result, “if students have access to textbooks and curriculum 
materials to use at home,” they then have continuing access to information and can use the 
information they received to research, complete practice activities and exercises, and can further 
                                                 
171 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
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use the information they gain to prepare for class and tests.176 Without access to information at 
home via textbooks and other instructional materials, “teachers have a difficult time assigning 
out-of-school learning experiences that require students to have access to the [information] 
included in the text, and students, particularly those with few books and learning resources at 
home, have difficulty completing such assignments.” 177   Trained teachers and instructional 
materials are particularly important because they are the primary conduits by which students 
receive the information necessary to knowledge and skill production that they might pass high 
stakes tests.178  
 
3. School Facilities are Essential Conduits of Information in Public Schools 
 
“The condition of school buildings, including but not limited to temperature, acoustics, 
and overcrowding” also impact the transmission of information in schools.179 “Researchers have 
repeatedly found a difference of between 5-17 percentile points between achievement of students 
in poor buildings and those students in above-standard buildings, when the socioeconomic status 
of students is controlled.”180 
 “The condition of a school building influences student learning directly, as well as 
indirectly,” as facilities may enhance or inhibit the effectiveness of a teacher’s transmission of 
information. 181  Poor school facilities diminish the transfer of information, which, in turn, 
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179 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
of California at 8. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://decentschools.org/expert_reports/oakes_report.pdf 
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negatively impacts student performance. 182  For example, “[t]eachers in buildings in poor 
condition stated that the design and appearance of the facility had a negative impact upon the 
learning climate. Conversely, teachers in buildings in good condition reported the building had a 
positive influence upon the learning climate.”183 As the learning climate is the environment in 
which the transmission of information takes place, the school itself is a conduit of information, 
as deficiencies in the school’s facility adversely impact the transmission of information therein.  
 
4.  Property Tax Based Systems Substantially Restrict School Financial Resources 
Which Purchase Information Conduits for Some Students but Generously Endow 
Others 
 
Property tax based systems of funding public education substantially restrict financial 
resources for some school districts but generously endow others. The facts of San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez,184 best illustrate this point.  
When the Supreme Court considered San Antonio in 1973, Texas operated (and today 
still operates) its public elementary and secondary schools from contributions at both the state 
and local levels through the “Texas Minimum Foundation School Program”.185 Nearly fifty 
percent of the total educational expenditures in Texas were funded through this program to 
ensure a minimally basic education for all students enrolled in the state’s public school 
system.186 At the local level, each district contributed to financing its schools through property 
tax revenue generated within the district.187 
                                                 
182 Oakes, J. (2005, April 1). Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State 
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San Antonio’s plaintiffs asserted that Texas’ system of public school finance favored the 
rich through its emphasis on property taxation.188 The claim was based on the substantial inter-
district disparities in per-pupil expenditures, which result foremost from differences in the value 
of assessable property between the Edgewood Independent School District and the Alamo 
Heights Independent School District.189  
A comparison between Edgewood (least affluent) and Alamo (most affluent) school 
districts serves to highlight the substantial financial disparities caused by using property taxes to 
fund public education.190 When the Supreme Court decided San Antonio, the Edgewood School 
District enrolled approximately 22,000 students in its twenty-five elementary and secondary 
schools all of which are located in an inner-city area having little commercial or industrial 
property.191  Further, the district’s residents were predominately Mexican-American. 192  As a 
result, approximately 90% of the Edgewood student population was Mexican-American with 
over 6% being African American.193 The average assessed property value for students in the 
district was valued at $5,960.00 per pupil with a median family income of $4,686.00.194 Both of 
these figures were the lowest in the metropolitan area.195 Taxed at an “equalized rate of $1.05 per 
$100.00 of assessed property—the highest [tax rate] in the metropolitan area—the [Edgewood] 
district contributed $26.00 to the education of each child.”196 
In contrast, Alamo Heights educated approximately 5,000 students in an affluent residential 
community quite unlike the Edgewood District. 197  Alamo Heights’ school population was 
overwhelmingly caucasian with a Mexican-American population of 18% and an African American 
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population of less than 1%.198 The assessed property value per student in the Alamo district 
exceeded $49,000.00 (more than 8 times that of Edgewood) with a median family income of 
$8,001.00 (more than 1.5 times that of Edgewood).199 Accordingly, at a local tax rate of $.85 per 
$100.00 (in comparison to $1.05 per $100 in Edgewood), Alamo Heights raised a $333.00 per 
pupil contribution for pupil instruction in comparison to Edgewood’s $26.00, which equates to a 
$307.00 differential per student.200  Multiplying this $307.00 differential by the 22,000 students 
then enrolled in the Edgewood School District means that at the time San Antonio was filed, the 
property tax based system of funding public education disadvantaged Edgewood in its efforts to 
provide access to information to its students to the tune of six-million, seven-hundred fifty-four 
thousand dollars ($6,754,000.00) in comparison to Alamo Heights which received the $6.75 
million dollar benefit. Thus, the effect of property tax based school funding systems is this: those 
residing in areas with diminished property values must tax themselves at the highest rate to 
produce fewer financial resources to provide access to the conduits of information for their 
students, whereas the affluent, residing in areas with increased property values, may tax themselves 
at a significantly lower rate, but still produce an over-abundance of financial resources to provide 
their students with greater access to information in public schools.  
 
5. The Financial Restrictions Imposed by Property Tax Based School Funding Systems 
Restrict Students’ Access to Information Bearing Conduits in Public Schools in 
Violation of Students’ First Amendment Rights  
 
School districts need financial resources to provide equal access to the conduits Williams 
defines in order to satisfy students’ First Amendment rights. However, San Antonio shows how 
property tax based systems limit the ability of some districts to generate revenue, while generously 
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providing substantially enhanced purchasing power for others. In order to subject this system to the 
highest level of judicial scrutiny, it must first be shown that property tax based systems of 
funding public education are likely to substantially restrict students’ access to the conduits of 
information. 
Taken together, Williams determined that schools must be ubiquitously equipped with the 
following conduits in order to for it to be said that equal access to equal information is being 
provided:201.  
A) Each student must have his or her own reasonably current textbook or educational 
materials, in useable condition, in each core subject (1) to use in class without 
sharing with another student; or (2) to use at home each evening for homework; 
 
B) Each student must have a qualified teachers such that (1) the student attends a 
class or classes for which a permanent teacher is assigned; or (2) the student attends 
a school in which no more than 20% of teachers do not have full, non-emergency 
teaching credentials; or (3) the student is an English Language Leamer ("ELL") and 
is assigned a teacher who has been specially qualified by the state to teach ELL 
students; 
 
C) Each student must have adequate, safe and healthful school facilities such that (1) 
the student attends classes in one or more rooms in which the temperature does not 
fall outside the 65-80 degrees Fahrenheit range; or (2) the student attends classes in 
one or more rooms in which the ambient or external noise levels do not regularly 
impede verbal communication between students and teachers; (3) there are sufficient 
numbers of clean, stocked and functioning toilets and bathrooms; and (4) there are 
no unsanitary and unhealthful conditions, including the presence of vermin, mildew 
or rotting organic material; 
 
D) No lack of educational resources such that (1) the school offers academic courses 
and extracurricular offerings in which the student can participate without paying a 
fee or obtaining a fee waiver; and (2) the school provides the student with access to 
research materials necessary to satisfy course instruction, such as a library or the 
Internet;202  
 
E) No overcrowded schools such that (1) the student is subject to a year-round, 
multi-track schedule that provides for fewer days of annual instruction than schools 
on a traditional calendar provide; (2) the student is not bused excessive distances 
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from his or her neighborhood school; and (3) the student attends classes in one or 
more rooms that are not so overcrowded that there are insufficient seats for each 
enrolled student to have his or her own seat or where the average square footage per 
student is not less than 25 square feet. 
 
A school district must have enough money to purchase the necessary conduits of 
information listed above if students are to access them in schools. For example, limited funding 
restricts a school district’s ability to provide “competitive teacher salaries and high quality working 
conditions,” which impairs districts’ ability to offer incentives to recruit highly qualified teachers 
into the most needed areas like “mathematics, science, computer technology, special education, 
and bilingual education development, where there are genuine under-supplies of candidates.”203 
Limited funding further restricts districts’ abilities provide “additional compensation, support and 
training that would attract and retain highly qualified teachers in schools where students are most at 
risk.”204 With respect to textbooks and other instructional materials, a lack of funding means that 
districts cannot “purchase materials in sufficient quantities for all students to have them in every 
core subject for use in class and at home.”205 As to facilities, “school districts who are unable to 
pass a school bond measure or are unable to afford the indebtedness associated with repayment of 
a school bond measure…are less likely to meet local needs [because]…low wealth districts will 
need to levy a higher tax rate in order to repay a bond of equal magnitude issued by a high property 
wealth district,”206 as shown in the tax rate comparison of Edgewood and Alamo Heights.  
Therefore, given the fact that the amount of money a district has determines its ability to 
provide its students with access to the necessary conduits of information, a tax scheme that endows 
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certain districts’ with the ability to purchase the necessary conduits but restrains others’, violates 
the adversely affected students’ First Amendment rights to access the same conduits and same 
information as the other similarly situated students as established collectively by Tinker, Sweatt, 
and Brown. In effect, the tax limits the circulation of information in some schools by failing to 
provide the conduits that circulate information, while providing wide access to those conduits for 
others. In this way, property tax based systems of funding public education operate as 
impermissible prior restraints because the tax scheme results in the failure of districts to provide 
access to information for some students while granting uninhibited access for others.  
 
B. The Information Students Seek to Access in Public Schools is Protected by the First 
Amendment Because the Information is Not Obscene, Does Not Incite Imminent 
Lawless Action, and Is Not Commercial Speech 
 
The information students seek to access in public schools must be protected by the First 
Amendment if the prior restraint imposed by property tax based school funding systems is to be 
subjected the highest level of judicial scrutiny. 207  There are primarily three categories of 
information that are not protected by or receive less than full First Amendment protection. These 
categories are: (1) obscenity, (2) speech intended to incite imminent lawless action, and (3) 
commercial speech.208 If the information transmitted to students in public schools falls into any 
of these three categories, the First Amendment will not protect the information and strict 
scrutiny, the highest level of judicial scrutiny, will not attach. If the information transmitted in 
schools falls outside these categories, the First Amendment will protect the information students 
seek to access in schools and strict scrutiny will attach. If strict scrutiny attaches, the government 
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will have to show that the comparative denial of access to information for some students and not 
others in public schools is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.209 
 
1. The Information Transferred in Public Schools is Not Obscene  
 
The Supreme Court articulated the test for obscenity in Miller v. California.210  There, the 
Court held that the basic guidelines for determining whether information is obscene is whether the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the information, 
taken as a whole, (a) appeals to the prurient interest; (b) that the information depicts or describes 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and (c) that the information, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.  
First, the information transferred in public schools does not appeal to the prurient interest. 
Schoolchildren only seek to access the information critical to their intellectual growth and 
development. As reading, writing, and arithmetic do not of themselves encourage an excessive 
interest in sexual matters, it cannot be said that the “dominant theme”211 of the information 
conveyed in schools appeals to the prurient interest. Students only seek the information essential 
to their passing standardized tests.  
Nor is the information transmitted in schools patently offensive; the information circulated 
in schools “affronts [no] contemporary community standards” as learning offends no one, but 
instead, is aspired to by every one. 212 
Finally, the great literary, artistic, political, and scientific value of the intellectual 
scholastic information conveyed in the Nation’s classrooms is so plainly obvious that it need not 
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be discussed.213 As a result, it cannot be said that the information transmitted in schools is 
obscene and thus not protected by the First Amendment.  
 
2. The Information Transferred in Public Schools Is Not Likely to Produce Imminent 
Lawless Action  
 
Second, the transmission of schoolhouse information is not directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action, nor is the transmission of information regarding science, 
math, and history, likely to incite or produce such action.214 In fact, U.S. history reveals the exact 
opposite. It has been those times when equal access to equal measures of schoolhouse 
information has been denied to individuals that we have seen the greatest, and some times 
violent, agitation for its wide dissemination. For example, President Eisenhower was compelled 
to federalize the Arkansas National Guard and directed the 101st Airborne Division of the United 
States Army to protect the “Little Rock Nine” from blatant and belligerent racists as those 
students sought equal access to the information being provided at Central High School.215 Thus, 
because it cannot be said that the academic information sought by students in schools is of itself 
likely to incite or produce imminent lawless action, First Amendment protection for the 
information sought in schools cannot be denied on these grounds.  
 
3. The Information Transferred in Public Schools Is Not Commercial Speech 
 
Finally, it cannot be said that the information being offered in schools is commercial 
speech and should therefore receive less than full First Amendment protection.  
                                                 
213 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) 
214 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
215 See Smith, Jean Edward (2012). Eisenhower in War and Peace. Random House. p. 723. 
  - 41 - 
Commercial speech is the conveyance of information that proposes a purely commercial 
transaction.216 By contrast, information is transmitted to students in schools to expand ideas and  
enable students to pursue “truth, science, morality, and arts in general,”217  not to convince 
students to buy a product. As a result, the proposition that in-school information is unprotected 
because it is commercial speech cannot be reasonably sustained.  
 
C. The Prior Restraint Imposed by Property Tax Based School Funding Systems Fail 
to Meet Strict Scrutiny and Must Fall Because The Information Transmitted in 
School is Protected by the First Amendment 
 
The foregoing shows that the First Amendment protects the information transmitted in 
public schools because the information being transferred: (a) is not obscene; (b) is not likely to 
incite imminent lawless action; and (c) does not propose a commercial transaction. Thus, the 
information students seek to access in schools is protected by the First Amendment.218 The above 
also shows how property tax based school funding systems restrict the circulation of information 
in schools by failing to provide access to the necessary conduits of information for some 
students, while ubiquitously providing that access for others. Based on these two showings, 
property tax based systems of funding public education are prior restraints on students’ access to 
information in public schools as the information students seek to access is (1) protected by the 
First Amendment and (2) property tax based school funding systems restrict the circulation of 
protected information.   
Having established the prior restraint, the government must show that the prior restraint 
meets the highest test of judicial scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny, in order to be upheld. To 
meet this test, the government must show that the prior restraint is necessary to achieve a 
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compelling government interest.219 As a result, this section turns to examine whether a state’s 
restriction of the circulation of information in schools by failing to provide access to the 
necessary conduits of information for some students, while ubiquitously providing that access for 
others, meets the strict scrutiny standard or is otherwise defensible.  
Plyler v. Doe stands for the proposition that there is no rational basis for state action 
depriving an individual access to information in public schools.220 The rational basis test is the 
minimal level of scrutiny that all challenged government actions must meet. 221  “The basic 
requirement is that a law meets rational basis review if it is rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose.”222 Because Plyler holds there is no rational basis for denying an individual 
access to information in public schools, the prior restraint imposed by property tax based school 
funding systems cannot meet strict scrutiny, and thus, cannot be upheld.  
 In Plyler, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute that withheld funds 
from local school districts that provided access to information for individuals who were not legally 
admitted into the United States. 223  The law further authorized local school districts to deny 
enrollment to such individuals, leaving them completely without access to information in the 
state’s public schools. 224 Though the Plyler Court attempted to reinforce San Antonio’s premise 
that access to information in schools is not a fundamental right because it is not explicitly written 
in Constitution,225 the Court nonetheless distinguished access to information in public schools 
from run-of-the-mill state sponsored programs which are subject to arbitrary denial. The Court 
said that access to information in public schools is not “merely some governmental benefit 
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indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.” 226 The Plyler Court reiterated 
that “[b]oth the importance of [access to information in public schools] in maintaining our basic 
institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the 
distinction.”227 The Court explained that: 
“The American people have always regarded education and [the] 
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance. We have 
recognized the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the 
preservation of a democratic system of government, and as the primary 
vehicle for transmitting the values on which our society rests. As ... 
pointed out early in our history ... some degree of education is necessary to 
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open 
political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. And 
these historic perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have 
been confirmed by the observations of social scientists. In addition, 
education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead 
economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education 
has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot 
ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups 
are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social 
order rests.”228  
 
The Supreme Court could not ignore the effects of arbitrarily denying individuals equal 
access to information in public schools. As a result, the Court subjected the state’s action to 
judicial scrutiny by applying the rational basis test.229 The rational basis test is the lowest, most 
basic level of judicial review whose basic requirement is that the challenged law be rationally 
related to any legitimate government purpose.230 If a law fails rational basis scrutiny, it cannot 
meet strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review, which requires the challenged law to be 
necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.   
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In assessing whether there was a rational purpose for the denial, the Court considered the 
“costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who would [be the states’] victims” if states are 
allowed to arbitrarily pick and choose which individuals have access to information in America’s 
public schools.231 The Court said that by denying individuals access to information in public 
schools, “we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and 
foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the 
progress of our Nation.”232 The Court concluded: 
“It is difficult to understand precisely what the state hopes to achieve by 
promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our 
boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, 
and crime. It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by denying 
these children [equal access to information in schools], they are wholly 
insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the state, and the 
Nation.”233 
 
This cost-benefit-analysis led the Court to find no conceivably legitimate purpose for 
arbitrarily depriving students of equal access to equal information in America’s public schools. 
The Court specifically held that the state’s action in denying access to information in schools can 
“hardly be considered rational…”234 Even Texas’ claims of limited resources were not enough to 
justify deprivations of access.235  
As a result, states fundamentally lack the authority to deprive individuals of access to 
information in public schools because such deprivation has no legitimate government purpose.236 
Thus, neither complete nor comparative state depravations of access to information provided by 
public schools can be sustained, no matter the reason, because there is no conceivable rational 
basis for such an action. Because denials of equal access to equal information in schools fails to 
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meet rational basis scrutiny, such denials cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Thus, property tax 
based school funding systems, which inherently deny equal access to equal information as shown 
above, cannot meet strict scrutiny and must fall.  
By contrast, it will be argued that Plyler should be read narrowly and that it stands only for 
the proposition that complete, but not comparative, denials of access to information are forbidden 
by the Federal Constitution. It will be argued that so long as the state provides some access to some 
information for all, the respective degrees of access each individual enjoys is irrelevant. However, 
this distinction is a nonsensical distinction without a difference: a complete denial of access to 
information to one individual as opposed to others is a comparative denial as between them. 
Moreover, even a slight237 depravation as between individuals is still a comparative depravation as 
between them as one party would have greater access to information than the other, which is 
forbidden by Sweatt238 and Brown.239 The Plyer Court recognized this principle, saying, “If the 
state is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free [access to information] that it offers 
to other children in schools, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some 
substantial state interest.”240 Scarcity of resources is not enough.241  
As a result, it cannot be doubted that Plyler stands for the proposition that comparative 
deprivations of access to information in public schools, whether great or small, are equally 
forbidden, because any arbitrary depravation of any measure of access to information in school is 
inherently irrational. For this reason, the Plyler Court was able to repeat the maxim held in Brown 
v. Board of Education242:  
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“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity [to access 
equal information in public schools]. Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide [access to information in schools], is a right which must be 
made available to all on equal terms.”243 
 
 Thus, because property tax based school funding systems deny equal access to equal 
information in America’s public schools, they are impermissible prior restraints on students’ First 
Amendment rights to access information in public schools. Since these systems cannot meet strict 
scrutiny, and their depravations fail to meet rational basis, they must be declared unconstitutional.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DENIALS OF EQUAL ACCESS TO EQUAL INFORMATION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS VIOLATE STUDENTS’ FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
 
1. Property Tax Based School Funding Systems Violate Students’ Fifth And Fourteenth 
Amendment Substantive Due Process Rights To Property  
 
Having shown how property tax based systems of funding public education violate students’ 
First Amendment rights, this paper now turns to elaborate how depravations of equal access to 
equal information in schools violates students’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process rights to property. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide:  
 
Fifth Amendment: 
“No person shall be…deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.” 
 
Fourteenth Amendment:  
“No State shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law.” 
 
The existence of an individual right triggers two distinct burdens on the government.244 One 
is procedural: the government must provide adequate procedures when it takes away a person’s 
life, liberty, or property. The other is substantive: the government must justify an infringement 
by showing that its action is sufficiently related to an adequate justification.245 Litigation and 
judicial decision making in cases about the substantive portions of individual rights is best 
understood as addressing the following questions: (1) Is there a fundamental right? (2) Is the 
right infringed? (3) Is the government’s action justified by a sufficient purpose?246 This section 
generally focuses on establishing the violation of the substantive due process property rights 
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inherent in equal access to equal conduits of information provided in public schools by 
answering each of these three questions in turn. 
 
A. Equal Access to Equal Information in America’s Public Schools is a 
Fundamental Property Right 
 
Goss v. Lopez,247 establishes the property interest inherent in equal access to information 
in America’s public schools. The question in Goss was whether denying students’ access to the 
information circulated in school for ten days violated their procedural due process property rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment also protects this same right to 
property at the Federal level.   
The state of Ohio contended in Goss that because there is no textual constitutional right 
to an education, the due process clause does not protect against the state’s depravations of access 
to schoolhouse information.248 However, the Court explicitly rejected this analysis, saying that 
the state’s position wholly “misconceives the nature of the issue.”249  The Court explained that 
the Fourteenth Amendment forbids state depravations of any person’s life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.250 With respect to property, the Court noted that the Constitution 
itself does not create property interests, but that property interests are “created and their 
dimensions are defined by an independent source such as state statutes or rules entitling the 
citizen to certain benefits.”251 In making this distinction, the Court made it clear that though 
states may not be Constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain public school systems, 
where they do so and require their children to attend, the student has a “legitimate entitlement”252 
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to access the full and equal measure of information provided in public schools,253 for “a public 
education is a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause.”254 As a result, it 
is the Constitutional entitlement to access the full and equal measure of information in public 
schools, commensurate with all others, that is the property interest inherent in the compelled 
receipt of public education.  
The Goss Court was clear in its pronouncement that equal access to equal information in 
public schools is a fully protected property interest, as such access is a legitimate entitlement 
protected by the Constitution. However, the state of Ohio was adamant that its position was 
correct. Ohio argued that “even if there is a right to a public education protected by the due 
process clause generally, the clause comes into play only when the state subjects a student to a 
severe detriment or grievous loss.”255 The state claimed that 10 days’ depravation of access to the 
information transmitted in schools was “neither severe nor grievous” and therefore the due 
process clause is “of no relevance.”256  Again, the Court corrected the state’s error by saying that 
the state’s argument: 
“is again refuted by our prior decisions; for in determining whether due process 
requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the weight but to the 
nature of the interest at stake. [The students] were excluded from [accessing 
schoolhouse information] temporarily, it is true, but the length and consequent 
severity of a deprivation…is not decisive… The Court's view has been that as 
long as a property deprivation is not [too trivial or minor to merit 
consideration],257 its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be 
taken of the Due Process Clause. A 10-day suspension from school is not [too 
trivial or minor to merit consideration]258 in our view and may not be imposed in 
complete disregard of the Due Process Clause.259 
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By this holding above, Goss firmly established students’ entitlement to access information in 
schools as a property interest that cannot be infringed in the absence of due process.  
 
B. Property Tax Based School Funding Systems Deprive Students of Their 
Property Rights By Compelling Their Attendance In Schools Which Deny Them 
Equal Access to Equal Information 
 
1. Property Tax Based School Funding Systems Infringe Students’ Goss Given 
Entitlement to Access Equal Information in Public Schools 
 
Schools, and the components therein, are conduits of information.260 San Antonio shows 
how the property tax system of funding schools curtails the amount of revenue realized for a 
school’s transmission of information to its students. Williams shows how curtailed funding 
restricts access to the conduits that circulate the necessary information in schools. Goss shows 
how restricting access to information in public schools without due process of law violates 
students’ property rights.  
Property tax based school funding systems favor some students by providing increased 
revenue for their schools, which gives them greater access to the necessary conduits of 
information. On the other hand, the same system daily restricts other students’ access to those 
conduits, without any legal proceeding, by curtailing the resources that would otherwise provide 
them with equitable access. Thereby, students residing in districts that the property tax based 
funding system does not favor are daily restricted from accessing information to the same degree 
as their favored peers. In fact, compulsory school attendance laws force disfavored students, 
under penalty of state law, to attend schools that injure their property right by failing to provide 
equal access equal information as all other similarly situated. Therefore, if under Goss, a ten-day 
restriction of access from the information undergirding critical thinking training provided in 
schools is not insignificant and violates students’ property rights, then the sum of forced, daily 
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restrictions of access from equal information over the entirety of a student’s learning experience 
is even more an impermissible assault on students’ entitlement based property rights. As a result, 
the cumulative effect of the daily depravations of access to equal information in school caused 
by property tax based school funding systems is not insignificant and thus violates students’ 
property rights under Goss.  
 
2. Property Tax Based School Funding Systems Deny Students Their General Right 
to Access Property In America’s Meritocratic Knowledge Economy By Denying 
Them Equal Access to Equal Information in America’s Public Schools 
 
Property tax based school funding systems infringe students’ property right to access 
equal information by failing to provide the resources necessary for each student to equally access 
the necessary conduits of information as shown collectively through San Antonio,261 Tinker,262 
Sweatt263 Brown,264 Williams, and Goss.265 In particular, the Goss court noted that the deprivation 
of equal access to information in schools “interfere[s] with later opportunities for higher education 
and employment.”266 However, the impact of depriving students of their legitimate entitlement to 
access equal conduits of information is of greater weight than the Goss Court had room to fully 
discuss. As a result, this section expounds the substance of the holding that access to information 
in schools “interfere[s] with later opportunities for higher education and employment,”267 to more 
thoroughly show the weight of the property interest at stake in the infringement of students’ 
entitlement to access equal information in America’s public schools. This section shows the 
immense irreparable harm caused by depriving students of their fundamental property right to 
access equal information in the Nation’s public schools. 
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A. America is a Meritocratic Knowledge Society with a Meritocratic Knowledge 
Economy in Which Access to Property is Distributed Based on an Individual’s Access 
to the Information Circulated in Schools 
 
The distribution of property in American society is based on the distribution of knowledge 
and skill because America is a “meritocracy.” 268  Meritocracy is a notion based on Thomas 
Jefferson’s “natural aristocracy,” a social theory which is rooted in the principle that knowledge 
and skill, instead of birth and wealth, will ensure that property flows to those who ‘merit’ it by 
putting to use the information they accessed in schools.269 It is taken for granted, without plausible 
refute, that information, and access to it, is the basis of knowledge.  
Today, knowledge is an economic commodity distributed to the Nation’s students by the 
Nation’s public schools as schools provide access to information.270  Though knowledge and 
skill are distributed in ways other than through the educational system, if they were not 
distributed to anyone in any degree by the system, then the system of schools could not be 
claimed to be an educational system.271 For example,  
“If no one ever learned through the educational system to read, to 
calculate, or to exercise any number of other skills, then we might 
continue to say that the system is a means of child custodianship or 
that it is a device for controlling the size of the labor force, but we 
could not give any clear sense to the claim that it is an educational 
system. Educational benefits then, are those goods whose 
distribution by the system is a logically necessary condition for the 
system to be regarded as educational”272  
 
Because schools provide access to information, all the Nation’s schools are implicated in 
the distribution at least two kinds of goods or benefits: (1) educational benefits and (2) non-
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educational social goods.273 These goods and benefits are distributed based on the measure of 
access students have to the information they receive in schools.  
Knowledge and skill are the primary educational benefits resulting from accessing 
information in schools.274 By contrast, non-educational social goods are things such as income, 
occupational opportunity, status, prestige, and power.275 In a word, non-educational social goods 
are property in its various forms. Property is not distributed by the educational system.276 
However, American society distributes property based on the knowledge and skill an individual 
possesses. This is because America is a meritocracy: our fundamental, capitalistic principle is 
that knowledge and skill, instead of birth and wealth, will ensure that property flows to those 
who ‘merit’ it by putting to use the information they accessed in school.277 
B.   Denying Access to Equal Information in Schools Denies Access To Property by 
Irreparably Injuring Students’ Ability to Compete in America’s Meritocratic 
Knowledge Economy in Violation of Students’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
Property Rights  
 
All of the industries of the modern age are based on knowledge.278 In fact, the whole of 
the technology of the twenty-first century “embraces and feeds off the entire array of human 
knowledge.” 279  “Equally important and equally new is the fact that every one of the new 
emerging industries is squarely based on knowledge. Not a single one is based on experience.”280  
Knowledge “has become the foundation of the modern economy.” 281  In 1955, the 
knowledge industries, “which produce and distribute ideas and information rather than goods and 
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services,” accounted for twenty-five percent of the United States’ gross national product.”282 A 
decade later, the knowledge sector was one-third of a much larger national product, and in the 
1970’s it accounted for one-half the national product.283 In 1997, it accounted for sixty-seven 
percent of the national product.284 We are now many years hence. This statistical trend supports 
the proposition that “knowledge has become the central factor of production in an advanced, 
developed economy” such as the United States. 285  As a result, knowledge has become the 
primary industry and is “the essential and central resource of production.”286  
Most importantly, entering the knowledge society constituted “a real revolution both in 
the productivity of work and in the life of the worker.”287 “Because the knowledge worker tends 
to be a good deal better paid than the manual worker, and also to have much greater job security, 
knowledge has become the central cost…the main investment, and the main product of the 
advanced economy and the livelihood of the largest group in the [American] population.”288 
However, the greatest impact of entering the new knowledge society is “changing society from 
one of predetermined occupations into one of choices for the individual.”289 For example, less 
than two centuries ago, “even the educated man could only make a living through knowledge in 
a few narrowly circumscribed “professions”: clergyman, physician, lawyer, and teacher—plus 
the one newcomer—civil servant.”290 However, “most of mankind through the ages has had no 
choice at all [as] son followed father.”291 Moreover, peasantry was the one and only occupation 
for most of mankind.292 But now, in the present knowledge society, it is possible to “make one’s 
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living, and a good living at that, doing almost anything one wants to do and plying almost any 
knowledge,” so long as one possesses it.293  
The modern industries, therefore personify the new economic circumstances: “knowledge, 
that is, organized formal education, has replaced experience—acquired traditionally through 
apprenticeship—as the foundation for productive capacity and performance.”294 On this point, 
Drucker notes that the new industries: 
“[d]iffer from the traditional “modern” industries in that they will employ 
predominately knowledge workers rather than manual workers. Computer 
programming, for example, with its enormous employment opportunities, 
is semiskilled work. All that is needed to be a programmer is junior high 
school arithmetic, three months of training and six months of practice. But 
while the skill is not a very elevated one, it is based on knowledge rather 
than on experience or manual training.”295 
 
He continues, 
“The same goes for the other employment opportunities the new industries 
are likely to create. In number of jobs, they may be very large. Some of 
them will certainly be highly skilled…but in every case, the foundation of 
the job, whether skilled or unskilled, will be knowledge. The preparation 
for it will be a course of study rather than apprenticeship. The productivity 
of the worker will depend on his ability to put to work concepts, ideas, 
theories—that is, things learned in school—rather than skills acquired 
through experience.”296 
 
As a result, America’s economy is a knowledge economy,297and because America is a 
meritocracy, there exists a social state of affairs in which persons may access greater shares of 
property on grounds that they possess “greater knowledge and skill as attested to by the 
educational system.”298 Conversely, meritocracy is likewise the same grounds on which the 
denial of access to property is justified: those who have received unequal, and thereby inferior, 
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access to information, have less knowledge and skill, and therefore will not receive greater 
incomes, opportunities, status, and other forms of property.299  To deny this is to deny the long-
held and present belief in the pay-off of attending school.300 
In conclusion, America’s meritocracy grants property to those individuals who have 
greater access to information in schools. As a result, one must have equal access as all others to 
the information undergirding critical thinking training in order to have equal access to property 
in the United States. Thus, to deny equal access to information in schools is to deny equal access 
to property in terms of (1) the Supreme Court recognized legitimate entitlement to access 
information in public schools under Goss and (2) future access to all other forms of property 
resulting from knowledge based employment in the new knowledge economy. For this reason, 
“the state is constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a 
property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause,”301 because denying equal access 
to equal information in schools without due process of law denies equal access to property, in all 
its other forms, without due process of law. As property tax based school funding systems have 
been shown above to deny equal access to the necessary conduits of information in schools 
without due process of law, property tax based school funding systems thereby impermissibly 
infringe students’ vested entitlement property right per Goss, 302  and further impermissibly 
restricts their fundamental Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to equitably access to 
property in all its other forms given the connection between access to information, knowledge, 
employment, and property in America’s meritocratic knowledge economy. Goss expressly 
forbids this.303 
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C. There is No Justification for the Government’s Depravation of Students’ 
Property Rights Given the Magnitude of the Harm 
 
“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the [access to information] 
that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a 
showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.”304  
Plyler establishes that a lack of funding is no justification for providing disparate access 
to information in schools.305 As such, it is reasonably foreseeable that the government will next 
claim that its substantial interest in providing some students with greater access to information 
than it does others is to ensure that all students receive what the state considers to be a minimally 
basic or adequate education. This argument must be squarely addressed where it is asserted. 
A state’s prescribed curriculum, that is, the required courses that a state orders must be 
taught in a state’s schools, constitutes that particular state’s determination of a “minimally basic 
education.” For this reason, each state’s definition of what constitutes a minimally basic 
education is different from all others, because the courses each state mandates students take 
varies from state to state. However, the issue of what curriculum the state chooses to provide is 
fundamentally different from the issue of whether the state is providing equal access to the 
information undergirding the curriculum it chooses to provide. The distinction here is important 
because it marks the difference in jurisprudential analysis.  
States are not allowed to conflate their determination of what constitutes a minimally 
basic education with the question of whether they provide equal access to the information 
undergirding that curriculum in attempts to avoid responsibility for their provision of inequitable 
access; the United States Supreme Court has consistently maintained for more than a half-
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century that equal access to equal conduits of information is the standard of minimal adequacy 
with respect to access to information in schools no matter what the state decides its curriculum is. 
See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) and Brown v. Board, 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954).306  Thus, because the question does not turn on the adequacy of the states’ curriculums, 
but instead turns on whether the property tax based system of funding schools provides equal 
access to equal conduits of information undergirding whatever curriculum the state has decided 
to provide, the government cannot justify disparities in access to information in schools on 
grounds that it is providing a minimally basic education.  
Even if the above analysis is rejected, states nonetheless lack a substantial interest in 
denying equal access to information in schools for some while providing it for others. Plyler v. 
Doe stands for the proposition that there is no rational basis for state action depriving an 
individual equal access to equal information in public schools.307 The rational basis test is the 
minimal level of scrutiny that all challenged government actions must meet. 308  “The basic 
requirement is that a law meets rational basis review if it is rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose.”309 Because Plyler holds there is no rational basis for denying an individual 
equal access to information in public schools, property tax based school funding systems, which 
deny individuals their vested property right of equal access to equal conduits of information in 
public schools, cannot meet strict scrutiny, and thus, property tax based school funding systems 
cannot be upheld in violation of students’ property rights.310 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DENIALS OF EQUAL ACCESS TO EQUAL INFORMATION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS VIOLATE STUDENTS’ FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS TO PHYSICAL LIBERTY 
 
 
1. Property Tax Based School Funding Systems Violate Students’ Substantive Due 
Process Rights to Physical Liberty  
 
Having shown how property tax based systems of funding public education violate students’ 
substantive due process property rights, this paper now turns to elaborate how unequal access to 
information in schools violates students’ substantive due process rights to liberty. In order to 
prove a violation it must be shown (1) that there is a liberty interest at stake in accessing 
information in public schools (2) students’ rights to liberty are infringed by inequitable access to 
information in public schools, and  (3) that the government’s action in infringing students’ right 
to liberty is not justified by any sufficient purpose.311 
 
A. Students Have Fundamental Physical Liberty Interests at Stake in Compulsory 
Education 
 
O’Connor v. Donaldson312 establishes the general rule that states cannot constitutionally 
confine “a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or 
with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.” Moreover, Rone v. 
Fireman313 specifically lays out the authority under which involuntary civil confinement may be 
ordered. There are “two purposes for involuntary civil commitment advanced by a state: (1) 
fulfillment of its historic parens patriae function; and (2) accomplishment of its police power 
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objectives.”314 The continuing validity of compulsory school attendance laws, which fall within 
the states’ parens patriae function, are at issue here.315 
Pursuant to the parens patriae rationale, involuntary confinement “is based upon the need 
for care and treatment or protection from harm.”316 Here, states “act as the individual’s parent or 
guardian, and determine that in his best interest he requires or would benefit from treatment.”317 
In those instances where the parens patriae rationale is invoked to justify the individual’s 
confinement to receive care, treatment, or training, such training, care, or treatment must be 
provided, or the restrained individual must be released.318 Normally, only minimally adequate 
treatment is required in cases of involuntary confinement in mental institutions, hospitals, or 
other training or treatment facilities.319 However, in the unique context of public education, 
where the law compels individuals to receive formal critical thinking training in public schools, 
the training received by the confined individuals must be equal to that received by those 
similarly situated elsewhere per the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sweatt v. Painter,320 and Brown v. 
Board.321 Otherwise, compulsory school attendance laws must fall, for: 
“There can be no doubt that…involuntary confinement of an individual for any 
reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due 
process of law. Commitment must be justified on the basis of a legitimate state 
interest, and the reasons for committing a particular individual must be 
established in an appropriate proceeding. Equally important, confinement must 
cease when those reasons no longer exist.”322  
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B.  Property Tax Based School Funding Systems Violate Students’ Rights to 
Physical Liberty By Failing to Provide Equal Access to Equal Information in 
Schools 
 
1. The State’s Justification for Forcibly Confining Students In Schools is to Train 
Each Student to Think Critically So They May Be Economically Independent 
 
“If the purpose of commitment is training and treatment, due process requires, at the least, 
the provision of [that] training and treatment,” otherwise the individual is entitled to his 
freedom.323  In the case of compulsory schooling, the states have invoked the parens patriae 
rationale to compel students to receive information in schools on grounds that training students 
to conceptualize and analyze the information observed and communicated in school is in the 
students’ best interests.  In other words, the states have determined that they may forcibly confine 
and compel students to receive critical thinking training because the ability to conceptualize and 
analyze information gathered from observation and communication is the essence of critical 
thinking. 324  
The states’ legitimate interest in compelling students to receive critical thinking training is 
so that (1) “each individual may attain economic independence” to prevent their enrollment on 
the public dole and (2) that the individual be trained to “grant minimum obedience to civil 
law.”325 This has been the states’ reason for compulsory critical thinking training since 1642. 
Massachusetts’ Law of 1642, which compelled parents to educate children, is the oldest 
compulsory education statute in the Nation. It reads: 
“[T]aking into consideration the great neglect of many parents and masters in 
training up their children in learning, and labor, and other implyments [sic] which 
may be proffitable [sic] to the common wealth, do hereupon order and decree, that 
in euery [sic] town the chosen men appointed for managing the prudentiall [sic] 
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affajres [sic] of the same shall henceforth stand charged with the care of the 
redresse [sic] of this evill [sic]... and for this end they...shall have power to take 
account from time to time of all parents and masters and of their 
children...especially of their ability to read and understand the principles of 
religion and the capitall lawes [sic] of this country...” 326 
 
As a result, the states must train each student to the degree that they might each attain 
economic independence and grant obedience to civil law, as such is the states’ reason for forcibly 
confining them. Where the state fails in either of these two duties, it loses its justification to 
confine students and they must be released in accordance with their liberty interest, per Rone.327  
 
2. Securing Property Through Gainful Employment Based on the Application 
of Knowledge Gained from Accessing the Information Provided in School 
Establishes Economic Independence in America’s Knowledge Economy. 
 
It cannot be doubted that securing property in all its forms fundamentally equates economic 
independence, given the reality that economic independence increases with the amount of property 
one possesses. Further, gainful employment is the primary means through which property is 
secured; the other alternatives are theft, gift, or bequest, but these alternatives are not engaged here.  
Access to information is the basis of knowledge. Thus, access to information is 
prerequisite to securing gainful employment because gainful employment is based on the 
application of knowledge in the present knowledge economy. As Drucker notes, 
 “The new jobs that open up in the economy start out with theoretical and 
conceptual knowledge acquired systematically and in a “course.” Old jobs 
[have] either be[en] changed to knowledge jobs or will be replaced by 
knowledge jobs. We can expect, in other words, that we [have] 
develop[ed] a true knowledge economy, as we have already developed a 
knowledge workforce. A good deal of this knowledge work…[is] 
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semiskilled rather than highly skilled. But even then it require[s] a 
knowledge foundation acquired in school.”328  
 
This emphasis on work based on knowledge is only expected to increase in the future, 
especially where skills based on knowledge are required for employment. Therefore, if access to 
information is prerequisite to knowledge, and if possessing knowledge (as verified by certificates, 
degrees, diplomas, transcripts, test scores, and occupational licenses, etc., which are given by 
schools) is prerequisite to gainful employment in the knowledge economy, it follows then that 
access to information in schools is prerequisite to economic independence through the subsequent 
attainment of property, because access to information in schools is now prerequisite to gainful 
employment in ways unlike the past. Thus, where states fail to provide equal access to information 
in schools, adversely affected students cannot apply the information the state withheld from them, 
and thus will not have equal access to gainful employment, and will thereby lack economic 
independence equally as their well-trained peers in the present knowledge economy. As a result, 
where the state fails to provide equal access to equal information in public schools, states 
impermissibly inhibit individuals’ ability to “attain economic independence” given that equal 
access to information is essential to equal access to gainful employment and its resulting property 
in America’s knowledge economy. Thus, where the states fail to provide equal access to equal 
information in public schools, they fail to train each of their students to think critically, equally as 
their peers, and thereby fail to train the adversely affected students to secure property and 
economic independence equally as their peers, contrary to the states’ averred purpose of their 
confinement.  
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C. States Cannot Legally Compel Students To Attend Schools Which Fail to 
Provide Equal Access to Equal Information Because Such Confinement is 
Contrary to the States’ Justification For Their Confinement in Violation of 
Students Rights to Liberty.  
 
San Antonio shows how property tax based systems of funding students’ critical thinking 
training curtails the amount of revenue realized for a school’s transmission of information to its 
students. The information transferred in schools is the basis knowledge, and equal access to that 
information is the basis of equal critical thinking training as recognized in Tinker.329 Equal 
critical thinking training is prerequisite to establishing equal economic independence as shown 
above.  
Williams, shows how curtailed funding restricts access to the conduits that circulate the 
information necessary to equal critical thinking training. Goss established the connection 
between the information accessed in schools and property, and further establishes that restricting 
access to information in public schools without due process of law violates students’ property 
rights. O’Connor v. Donaldson, read with Brown and Sweatt, means that students have equal 
rights to access equal information undergirding critical thinking training so that each student may 
be economically independent through securing property to the fullest extent possible, as all 
others, for such is the states’ reason for confining them.  
Property tax based school funding systems, operating in light of compulsory school 
attendance laws, force disfavored students, under penalty of law, to attend schools which lack the 
resources necessary to give them the same access to the same information equally as their peers. 
Where the state restricts equal access to information for students in schools by failing to provide 
the necessary resources, it likewise hinders their ability to establish economic independence 
because access to the information provided in schools is essential to economic independence in 
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the present knowledge economy. Therefore, because the disparities produced by property tax 
based school funding systems restrict students’ access to information in schools, such funding 
systems ultimately hinder students’ ability to establish economic independence given the 
connection between access to information, critical thinking training, and gainful employment in 
the present knowledge economy.  
Schools, and the components therein, are conduits of information; they transfer 
information to students as part and parcel of students’ critical thinking training. As knowledge 
has become the economy’s “central resource,” it follows then that critical thinking training is the 
economy’s central resource. 330  Capital, otherwise, property “flows in response to greater 
opportunities created by the greater productivity of new knowledge, both of workers and 
managers.”331 It is noted that:  
Today’s knowledge worker is the successor to the manual worker, “skilled or 
unskilled.”332 Though the knowledge worker does not labor in the traditional 
sense, in that he is paid for “applying his knowledge, exercising his judgment, and 
taking responsible leadership,” he is nonetheless “dependent on his salary, on the 
pension benefits and health insurance that go with it, and altogether on having a 
job and getting paid.”333 Thus, in the knowledge society, the worker’s choice “is 
not between irksome jobs—which are irksome because they are “jobs”—and an 
illusory freedom. The choice is between jobs that have opportunity and are paid 
well” resulting from the possession and application of knowledge, or those which 
provide a “bare subsistence.”334  
 
Thus, by failing to provide equal access to equal information in schools, the states defeat 
their own purported interest in confining students so that they each be individually trained in 
critical thinking so they “may attain economic independence” to the fullest extent possible, given 
the connection between access to information and gainful employment in the knowledge 
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economy. 335  As a result, students suffering the injustice of unequal access to information must 
be released from their compulsory attendance, because compelling their attendance in schools 
that deny them equal access to information fails to train them to critically think such that they 
may be economically independent as their peers, which is altogether contrary to the states’ 
reason for confining them.  
 
D. There Is No Justification for Violating Students’ Liberty Interests by 
Compelling Their Attendance in Schools Which Do Not Provide Them with 
Equal Access to Information 
 
Because the fundamental right of liberty is at stake here, government action infringing 
this right must be necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. 336 Where the states’ 
actions fail to achieve their asserted compelling interest, those actions are not necessary to 
achieve that interest, and thus, the states’ actions are unconstitutional.  
Failing to provide all involuntarily confined students with equal access to equal 
information in schools, as their peers, violates students’ fundamental rights to liberty as their 
compelled denial of equitable access is incompatible with the states’ compelling interest for their 
confinement, which is to train each student to think critically, equally as their peers, so they may 
equally attain economic independence in the present knowledge economy. Where states fail to 
provide equal access to equal information such that students are equally trained to think critically, 
the state fails to train each student so they may equally attain economic independence in the 
present knowledge economy given the link between access to information and gainful 
employment. Thus, where States do not or cannot provide equitable access to the information 
undergirding critical thinking training to all confined students, the States have lost their grounds 
to curtail students’ liberty in schools. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1975).  
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By contrast, the states will argue that their compulsory school laws should be upheld; that 
all students, whether they be equally trained or not, should be forced to remain in schools, 
regardless of whether or not the states provide equal critical thinking training to their students as 
the systems’ goal is to provide a minimally adequate training. This “minimally-adequate-
something-is-better-than-nothing” argument must be disregarded. Courts may not assume that 
simply receiving training is sufficient to justify confinement, least of all on grounds that equality 
of training is a ‘nonjusticiable’ question that must be left to the discretion of the profession.337 
“The right to treatment doctrine is one that permits the Court to intervene where there is an 
absence or inadequacy of a program of treatment for an entire group of people who have found 
themselves in state custody or care. It is the absence or inadequacy of the program that permits a 
federal court to intervene.”338 Adequacy in the context of the provision of critical thinking 
training in public schools is determined by equality of access to equal conduits of information. 
This has been the Supreme Court’s rule for over a half century. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) 
and Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
As a result, the conclusion is this: either students will be provided equal access to equal 
information undergirding critical thinking training for all students so that each may be 
economically independent through securing property to the fullest extent possible per the states’ 
articulated reason for the students’ forced confinement, or the students must be released. If states 
cannot equally train all students, then the students must be given their freedom, for otherwise the 
states bless some with the training necessary to secure vast economic independence through 
securing property, and curse others to lives of little economic liberty by curtailing their ability to 
secure property through inferior critical thinking training. Additionally, it matters not whether 
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the compulsory school laws were originally founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis.339 
Thus, even if at one time the states provided all students with equal access to information in 
schools, where the states presently fail to provide all involuntarily confined students with equal 
access to information in schools, equal to their peers, they violate students’ rights to liberty.340 
Their denial of equal access to equal information is incompatible with the states’ justification for 
their confinement, and so the students must be released.341  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DENIALS OF EQUAL ACCESS TO EQUAL INFORMATION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS VIOLATE STUDENTS’ FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS TO LIBERTY BY IMPOSING AN IRREPARABLE STIGMA UPON THEM 
 
 
1. Compelled Receipt of Unequal Access to Information Imposes a Judicially 
Cognizable Stigma Which Violates Students’ Liberty Interests 
 
As shown above, denying equal access to equal information in public schools restricts 
students’ access to gainful employment in the modern knowledge economy. This denial of access 
imposes a stigma on the adversely affected students, further violating their liberty interests. In 
order to show stigmatic injury, the violation of “some concrete interest” which can independently 
be asserted, must first be shown.342 
 
A. Property Tax Based School Funding Schemes Independently Violate Students 
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Access Information, 
Property, and Liberty  
 
The earlier sections show how the states’ use of property tax based school funding 
systems fail to provide equal access to equal information in violation of students’ First 
Amendment rights to access to information in America’s public schools, per Tinker v. Des 
Moines. The forgoing sections also show that equal access to information is essential to equal 
critical thinking training.  
Further, the sections discussing Goss v. Lopez show how the denial of equal access to 
equal information in schools violates students’ property rights as students have legitimate 
entitlements to equally access equal information in public schools per Sweatt v. Painter and 
Brown v. Board. Finally, the sections immediately above show how denying equal access to 
equal information in public schools also infringes students’ physical liberty and general property 
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interests resulting from the connection between equal access to equal information in schools and 
gainful employment in the modern knowledge economy. As a result, the preexisting concrete 
injury to independent fundamental rights is shown in that states’ failure to provide equal access 
to information by operating property tax based school funding systems results in inequitable 
critical thinking training which acts as a prior restraint to the free exercising of students First, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, in violation of those rights themselves.  
Having established the independent violations of concrete fundamental rights, this paper 
now turns to show how property tax based school funding systems impose an impermissible 
stigma on adversely affected students by denying them equal access to equal information in 
America’s public schools.  
 
B. Freedom of Occupation is a Liberty Interest  
 
The concept of liberty was given great breadth and scope as contemplated by the framers 
of the United States Constitution.343 For example, President James Madison, one of the principal 
framers “maintained that liberty is the counterbalance that holds an overbearing government in 
check.”344 However, the Virginia State Supreme Court gave the most complete definition of the 
constitutional meaning of “liberty” in 1903 in Young v. Commonwealth.345 There, the court said: 
  
“The word “liberty,” as used in the Constitution of the United States and the 
several states, has frequently been construed, and means more than mere 
freedom from restraint. It means not merely the right to go where one chooses, 
but to do such acts as he may judge best for his interest, not inconsistent with 
the equal rights of others; that is, to follow such pursuits as may be best adapted 
to his faculties, and which will give him the highest enjoyment. The liberty 
mentioned is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the 
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live 
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, and for 
                                                 
343 Alexander, K., & Alexander, M. (2012). American Public School Law (8th ed., p. 867). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 
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that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and 
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purpose above 
mentioned. These are individual rights, formulated as such under the phrase 
“pursuit of happiness” in the Declaration of Independence, which begins with 
the fundamental proposition that all men are created equal; that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” 
 
Roth v. Board of Regents346 and Meyer v. Nebraska,347are touchstone cases in the Supreme 
Court’s liberty jurisprudence. In Roth, the Court stated that liberty is a broad and majestic term; it 
is among the great constitutional concepts purposely left to gather meaning from experience, and 
that liberty relates to the whole domain of social and economic fact.348 Roth echoes Meyer, which 
held that, “Without doubt,  [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
right of the individual…to engage in any of the common occupations of life [and] to acquire 
useful knowledge… and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”349 As a result, the United States 
Supreme Court holds that there is a liberty interest in an individual’s ability to (1) acquire useful 
knowledge and (2) to engage in the common occupations of life.  
 
C. Property Tax Based School Funding Systems Restrict Students’ Ability to 
Acquire Useful Knowledge and Inhibit Their Freedom to Engage in the 
Common Occupations of Life by Failing to Provide Equal Access to Equal 
Information in Public Schools  
 
Property tax based school funding systems restrain students’ access to equal information 
in schools, which inhibits their ability to acquire useful knowledge, which further restricts their 
ability to freely engage in the common occupations of life, in violation of their rights to liberty. 
Impermissible restraints on an individual’s freedom of occupational liberty impose stigmas of 
inferiority and involuntary servitude on adversely affected students.  
                                                 
346 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 
347 262 U.S. 390 
348 Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) 
349 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added) 
  - 72 - 
Certificates, degrees, diplomas, transcripts, test scores, and occupational licenses are tokens 
distributed by the states through their educational systems.350 They are not knowledge and critical 
thinking skills themselves, but they are representative of fact that the individual bearing them has 
received access to information in schools, and retained enough information, such that their token is 
both valid and valuable. Such validation “serves an essential role in establishing the medium of 
exchange” between individuals, organizations, and entities, as these credentials are most often 
exchanged for gainful employment.351 These tokens are essential to what it means for education to 
be a “system”352  
Securing employment in the present knowledge economy is based on certificates, degrees, 
diplomas, transcripts,  and occupational licenses, all of which are issued by the states after 
individuals have shown they have sufficiently retained the information state allowed them to 
access in schools by passing a standardized test. Thus, employment in the present knowledge 
economy is based on the amount and quality of the information students (1) access in schools 
and (2) retain, because receipt of the credentials listed above depends on access to and retention 
of information. It follows then that where the states fail to provide equal access to information in 
schools, they undercut the students’ ability to show that they have retained that information on 
standardized tests, because students cannot retain the information state inhibits them from 
accessing. 
Even where students do secure credentials from schools that provide them with inferior 
access to information, such a credential is still not as esteemed as those from other schools, 
which provide greater access to information. This is evidenced, for example, by the U.S. 
Department of Education’s distinction of “Blue Ribbon Schools.” These schools are “Exemplary 
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High Performing” and have “their state’s highest high school graduation rates and the highest 
achieving students (the top 15%) in English and mathematics, measured by state assessments.”353 
Needless to say, the students and the credentials of Blue Ribbon Schools will be highly sought 
after with respect to college admissions and subsequent employment than students of inferior 
schools, because students of Blue Ribbon Schools represent the individuals who have had the 
greatest access to information, and its resultant critical thinking training as evinced by test 
scores, whereas others increasingly have not.  
As a result, the states’ failure to provide equal access to equal information in schools 
comparatively burdens those not receiving equal access in ways unlike those who receive 
superior access: even if those receiving comparatively inferior access to information in schools 
do secure their credentials from schools which provide them with inferior access, their 
credentials will still carry comparatively diminished market value with respect to securing 
gainful employment in contrast to those who are given superior access, like the students of Blue 
Ribbon Schools. In this way, property tax based school funding systems’ failure to provide equal 
access to equal information for all students limits the adversely affected students’ freedom to 
choose their occupation by restricting their attainment of credentials and critical thinking training 
equal to those of their peers, who receive comparatively superior training and credentials 
resulting from greater access to information provided in their schools. This circumstance violates 
the adversely affected students’ fundamental rights to occupational freedom because property tax 
based school funding systems compels adversely affected students to go without equal access to 
the information undergirding their critical thinking training which diminishes the market value of 
their subsequent credential, unlike their peers. 
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D. Restricted Freedom of Occupational Liberty Imposes The Stigmas of Inferiority 
and Involuntary Servitude.  
 
Under the most basic definition of American liberty, students have right to be free from 
the compelled receipt of inequitable access to information in schools for it is a form of 
government interference which negatively impacts their labor. For example, one cannot become 
a doctor or lawyer where one cannot access the information necessary to comprehend the fields’ 
complex terminology or chemical formulas, no matter how strong the individual’s desire to be so 
employed. Additionally, one cannot become a physicist or biologist where the individual has 
never accessed the information laboratories and the accompanying resources contain, no matter 
the strength of the individual’s ambition.  
The tenets of classical liberalism, the foundation of the American democracy, provide 
that nothing is of “greater prominence than the notion of the dignity of labor.”354 For this reason, 
Justice Field concluded his thoughts on the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House 
Cases by saying that the Fourteenth Amendment: 
“protects every citizen of the United States against hostile and discriminating 
legislation against him in favor of others, whether they reside in the same or in 
different states...There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right to 
pursue unmolested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is nothing more 
nor less than the sacred right of labor.”355  
 
As shown in comparison to the history of the United States, today, equal access to 
information in schools is undeniably linked to labor in ways quite unlike America’s Agrarian and 
Industrial Eras. On this point, Frank Levy notes, 
“[I]n the 1950s the continuing mechanization of agriculture both made farming 
more efficient and displaced large numbers of farm laborers. Often however, farm 
laborers could get on a bus to a city where they could find factory jobs at higher 
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pay. In other words, the 1950’s economy was not skill-biased: Low skilled 
workers displaced in one industry could get good jobs in another and so incomes 
automatically grew throughout the distribution…Today, the economy favors the 
better educated over the less educated. When computerization or international 
trade displaces a semi-skilled worker, the move to a good job means acquiring the 
training to become a computer repairman or a laboratory technician, a much 
harder move than getting on a bus.”356 
 
Thus, where students do not receive equal access to information, their liberty to choose 
the calling in which they will labor is restricted in ways unlike ever before, given the intimate 
coupling between knowledge and work in the present knowledge economy. As a result, students 
not receiving equal access to equal information are relegated to positions of involuntary 
servitude because a lack of access to equal information restricts their freedom of choice of 
occupation. Though at first glance the verbiage “involuntary servitude” appears an anachronism 
of the past, consider Justice Field’s statement in his dissent in Slaughterhouse. There he stated 
that the Constitution: 
“prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime…the language…is general and universal in its application… 
 
The words ‘involuntary servitude’ have not been the subject of any judicial or 
legislative exposition…It is, however, clear that they include something more 
than slavery in the strict sense of the term; they include also serfage, vassalage, 
villenage, peonage, and all other forms of compulsory service for the mere 
benefit or pleasure of others. Nor is this the full import of the terms. The 
abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude was intended to make every one 
born in this country a freeman, and as such to give to him the right to pursue 
the ordinary avocations of life without other restraint than such as affects all 
others, and to enjoy equally with them the fruits of his labor. A prohibition to 
him to pursue certain callings, open to others of the same age, condition, and 
sex…would so far deprive him of the rights of a freeman, and would place him, 
as respects others, in a condition of servitude. A person allowed to pursue only 
one trade or calling, and only in one locality of the country, would not be, in 
the strict sense of the term, in a condition of slavery, but probably none would 
deny that he would be in a condition of servitude. He certainly would not 
possess the liberties nor enjoy the privileges of a freeman. The compulsion 
which would force him to labor even for his own benefit only in one direction, 
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or in one place, would be almost as oppressive and nearly as great an invasion 
of his liberty as the compulsion which would force him to labor for the benefit 
or pleasure of another, and would equally constitute an element of servitude. 
… ‘wherever a law of a state, or a law of the United States, makes a 
discrimination between classes of persons, which deprives the one class of 
their freedom or their property…there involuntary servitude exists within the 
meaning of the thirteenth amendment.”357  
 
Justice Field ultimately concluded that it is the government’s encroachment upon the unfettered 
freedom to choose one’s occupation, conversely, the government’s active or passive depravation of 
rights, that places an individual in a state of involuntary servitude. In making this point, Justice 
Field recounted the legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment, saying,  
“This legislation was supported upon the theory that citizens of the United States 
as such were entitled to the rights and privileges enumerated, and that to deny to 
any such citizen equality in these rights and privileges with others, was, to the 
extent of the denial, subjecting him to an involuntary servitude. Senator Trumbull, 
who drew the act and who was its earnest advocate in the Senate, stated, on 
opening the discussion upon it in that body, that the measure was intended to give 
effect to the declaration of the amendment, and to secure to all persons in the 
United States practical freedom. After referring to several statutes passed in some 
of the southern states, discriminating between the freedmen and white citizens, and 
after citing the definition of civil liberty given by Blackstone, the Senator said: ‘I 
take it that any statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of 
civil rights, which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon 
his liberty; and it is in fact a badge of servitude which by the Constitution is 
prohibited.'358  
 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez,359 and Williams show how property tax based school funding 
systems operate as a restraint that affects some and not all others with respect to providing access 
to information in America’s public schools. As shown above, the connection between such access, 
the resultant critical thinking training and credentials, and employment in the present knowledge 
economy are so intimately intermeshed that denying access to equal information in schools denies 
equal freedom in choice of occupation. As a result, funding disparities, which deny equal access to 
                                                 
357 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 89-91 (1872).(emphasis added) 
358 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 91-92 (1872)(emphasis added) 
359 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
  - 77 - 
equal information, operate as a restraint on the individual’s right to acquire useful knowledge and 
pursue the ordinary avocations of life.  
San Antonio v. Rodriguez shows how the property tax system school funding system 
restricts the amount of revenue realized for a school’s transmission of information to its students, 
and Goss establishes that restricting students’ access to information in public schools without due 
process of law violates students’ property rights. Wherever a law makes a distinction which 
deprives a person of property, “there involuntary servitude exists within the meaning of the 
[Constitution].”360 Thus, the stigma of involuntary servitude attaches to students lacking equal 
access to equal information in schools because they are denied their property right to access such 
equal information, which is essential to equal critical thinking training, credentials, and the 
subsequent freedom of choice of occupation, given that their ability to freely choose their later 
occupation in the knowledge economy depends on the measure of their present access to 
information in schools, which the states restrict by using property tax based systems to fund 
schools.  
 
2. Imposition of the Stigma is Not Justified.  
 
“A constitutionally protected liberty interest exists where there is some stigma attached to 
one’s good name, reputation, or integrity, but only when coupled with some “tangible” interest that 
is affected or a legal right that is altered, such as the loss of present or future employment.”361Since 
the imposition of involuntary servitude is a stigma impacts fundamental liberty and property 
interests, and future employment, the state must show that its imposition is necessary to achieve a 
compelling government interest. In other words, the state must show that depriving students equal 
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access to equal information in schools and thereby imposing the resulting stigma upon them is 
necessary to achieve some higher purpose.  
This author conceives no plausible reason, let alone compelling argument, that has not already 
been discussed and defeated above that justifies the states’ providing greater access to information 
to some of its children than it does its others. Goss has already determined that denials of equal 
access to information in schools without due process of law “interfere[s] with later opportunities 
for higher education and employment” 362  and Slaughterhouse conclusively states that such 
interference infringes liberty interests.363 
Because there is no legitimate reason for the state to provide unfettered access to information to 
some of its students, but wholly deny the same to others, especially in light of the subsequent 
liberty and property interests affected as explicated above, property tax based school funding 
systems must fall in light of students First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access equal 
information in America’s public schools.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MUST AFFIRMATIVELY ACT TO PROTECT 
STUDENTS’ FIRST, FIFTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO ACCESS 
EQUAL INFORMATION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
1. The Federal Government Must Guarantee Public Schools Students’ Equal Access to Equal 
Information in Accordance First Amendment, Liberty, and Property Interests 
 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Prohibits States from Infringing Students’ 
Information Access, Liberty, and Property Rights  
 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No State shall…deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.” As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment is an 
affirmative prohibition against the states’ infringement of an individual’s rights to life, liberty or 
property.364 Specifically, in the context of this paper, the Fourteenth Amendment means that 
states are prohibited from failing to provide all students with equal access to equal conduits of 
information in America’s public schools, because the failure to provide equal access to 
information in schools violates students’ rights to access information, their property rights, and 
physical and stigmatic liberty interests, as shown in the pages above.  
The Supreme Court observed in Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “was ordained for a purpose. It was to secure equal rights to all persons, and, to 
insure to all persons the enjoyment of such rights, power was given to Congress to enforce its 
provisions by appropriate legislation.”365 Thus, even though public education is generally in the 
states’ domain, Congress is authorized to intervene to remedy the access disparities caused by 
property tax based school funding systems, even though the statutes authorizing property tax 
based school funding systems are facially valid, in that they do not textually discriminate 
between individuals or groups. 
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Williams defines the necessary conduits to which all students must have access to in order 
for it to be said that all students are being provided equal access to equal information in public 
schools. Additionally, where states fail to provide students with equal access to equal conduits of 
information in accordance with their First Amendment right to access information, their liberty 
interests, and property rights, the states violate their prohibition per the Fourteenth Amendment, 
given the effects resulting from failing to provide each student with equal access to equal 
information.  
A. Congress Has the Authority to Remedy Past and Prevent Future State Violations 
of the Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Liberty and Property  
 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that Congress shall have the power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate legislation. This enforcement power is a 
“broad power indeed” 366  and grants Congress “the authority both to remedy and to deter 
violations of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment” 367  The Supreme Court has 
“repeatedly affirmed that Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes 
facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.” 368 
However, authorization to exercise a granted power does not equate a mandate to use that power. 
As a result, a court order is necessary to compel action to remedy the violation of rights caused 
by property tax based school funding systems. A court order is necessary because Congress 
“cannot decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the states. … It has 
[only] been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a 
constitutional violation. The ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch.”369 As a result, 
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the right to equal access to equal information in schools must first be vindicated in the Supreme 
Court for only a declaration of rights by the Nation’s highest court can compel Federal 
government action. Once the right is declared, then the appropriate remedy can be fashioned.  
 
B. The Appropriate Remedy is One Where the States Retain Their Primacy in 
Curricular Decisions but the Federal Government Freely and Directly Subsidizes the 
States’ Educational Efforts To Prevent the States’ Fourteenth Amendment Default 
 
It is a legal truth that the states’ lack of funding is no excuse for failing to provide equal 
access to equal information in public schools per Plyler v. Doe.370 However, it is manifest reality 
that a state’s lack of funds will prevent it from remaining within the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition, for if a state, or its subsidiary, lacks the necessary funds, equal access to equal 
information simply cannot be provided. Thus, a state will perpetually violate its Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibition, so long as it lacks the funds to provide equal access to equal conduits of 
information in public schools. It is the Federal Government’s responsibility to prevent this 
perpetual default.  
Should a court find that property tax based school funding systems violate students’ 
fundamental rights as described in this paper, then the states must first be enjoined from 
operating school funding systems that (1) produce gross funding disparities and (2) fail to 
provide equal access to equal information to each student in every school;371 (3) the states must 
be enjoined to craft revised funding systems which provide Williams’ conduits to each student, 
based completely on general revenue streams, the allocations from which are based on the real 
cost differences in serving different communities and students, not errant property values.372  
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However, it is duly noted that the states may still fall short in producing the funds necessary 
to provide each student with Williams’ conduits even with revised school funding programs. 
Nonetheless, the states’ funding schemes must still be revised to draw from a general revenue 
base and allocate based on the real cost of educating its students because property tax based 
school funding systems independently violate students’ rights to access equal information, and 
their liberty and property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; but because the access, 
liberty, and property rights affected apply with equal force to the Federal Government through 
the Fifth Amendment, the Federal Government is then affirmatively obligated to guarantee that 
the states do not violate their prohibition by ensuring that the states have the resources to outfit 
every student with equal access to equal conduits of information in public schools.  
The Fifth Amendment reads as the Fourteenth: “No person shall be…deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.” As a result, once the rights described above are 
declared, where the Federal Government fails to prevent the states from violating their 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibition, it will subsequently violate its own Fifth Amendment 
prohibition by being complicit in the states’ denials of fundamental rights and freedoms. Thus, 
the Federal Government will be in violation of students’ First Amendment and Fifth Amendment 
rights to where it allows the states to persist in violating students’ rights to access information, 
liberty, and property by failing to assist the states in fully funding their education systems such 
that every student has equal access to equal conduits of information, per their rights under 
Tinker, Goss, Sweatt, and Brown. Providing direct and detached financial assistance to the states, 
so they can fully fund their education systems such that each student has equal access to equal 
information in schools is an appropriate measure which the Constitution commands be taken to 
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protect students’ First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and to prevent the states’ 
continuing default as shown above.  
This proposed remedy may not be perfectly stated, but its gist is this: (1) the states should 
be ordered to calculate the actual cost of providing equal access to equal information based on 
Williams’ criteria for each of its students in public school; (2) the states should next be ordered to 
design general revenue based funding schemes which generate and allocate resources based on 
the real cost to provide Williams’ conduits to each student based on the differences inherent in 
serving different communities and students; and (3) because it is very likely that the actual cost 
of providing Williams’ conduits to each student will be beyond the states’ reach, given even their 
best efforts in redesigning their funding schemes to provide Williams’ conduits to each student, 
the Federal Government must freely supply the difference to ensure that the states’ education 
systems are fully funded, 373  so that no student’s rights are violated, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition against the states is maintained. At no point under this remedy should 
the federal funds given be used to coerce changes in the states’ curriculums. The states must 
always retain wide freedom as laboratories of innovation.374 Therefore, it is repeated: the proper 
role of the Federal Government here is to serve as the guarantor of fundamental rights, as it has 
always done, by ensuring that the states’ education systems are fully funded so that the Williams’ 
conduits are accessible to every student, so that no student’s rights are violated, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against the states is maintained. 
 
                                                 
373 “fully funded” means “as measured by the presence of Williams’ conduits for each student enrolled in America’s public schools” 
374 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
This Dissertation presents viable legal arguments to show how property tax based school 
funding schemes violate students’ First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment fundamental rights to 
access equal information in America’s public schools. This effort was engaged because: 
“The time has long since passed when America could afford to make distinctions of 
any type, be it race, class, or residence. As we have now fully taken our place in the 
digital, globalized age, the remaining countries of the world are passing us by, 
outranking us in education while we factionalize our education system on the basis 
of where we live.” 375  
 
The fundamental truth is this: America’s students, the next generation of world leaders, 
each deserve the best education our country can provide no matter where they live, not because of 
where they live, and this principle must be manifested if America is to once again rank first in the 
world in education.376 San Antonio v. Rodriguez upholds the most unreasonable premise that 
disparities in critical thinking training are permissible because there exists no fundamental right to 
an education in the United States. However, we must reject the premise that the system we 
currently have is the system we will always have,377 for it is “beyond argument that the right to 
receive a public education is a basic personal right” held equally by all.378Therefore, it is my great 
hope, that the collection of thoughts printed on these pages will be the catalyst in one day 
guaranteeing equal access to equal information for all the Nation’s students by overturning San 
Antonio and establishing their fundamental right to equal educational opportunity in the United 
States.  
                                                 
375 Ash, Carey Hawkins and Chanee D. Anderson (2013). The Same but Different: “Post Racial Inequality in American Public Education in The 
Resegregation of Schools: Education and Race in the Twenty-First Century. (p. 24). New York, NY: Routledge. 
376 Ash, Carey Hawkins and Chanee D. Anderson (2013). The Same but Different: “Post Racial Inequality in American Public Education in The 
Resegregation of Schools: Education and Race in the Twenty-First Century. (p. 24). New York, NY: Routledge. 
377 Ash, Carey Hawkins and Chanee D. Anderson (2013). The Same but Different: “Post Racial Inequality in American Public Education in The 
Resegregation of Schools: Education and Race in the Twenty-First Century. (p. 24). New York, NY: Routledge. 
378 Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F.Supp.1155, 1158 (1971) 
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